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This thesis addressed the question of which factors most
highly influence the career decision of officers in the U.S.
Army and Marine Corps who are between their fourth-year and
twelfth-year of service. - This was accomplished using data
from the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel
in a logistic regression model.
Several conclusions were drawn from this study.
Intrinsic factors appear to contribute more to the career
decision than extrinsic factors. Specifically, promotion
probability and satisfaction with current job have the most
influence. Extrinsic factors are still significant but to a
lesser degree. Personal factors, especially length of
service and sex, are also important. The impact of
individual factors, however, is generally quite small; so an
effective retention program must include a combination of
factors. Finally, the Army as a whole, Ilarine Corps as a
whole, and Army medical specialists are not homogeneous and
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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to sustain an adequate defense force, it is
necessary to bring into the service a sufficient number of
personnel to meet anticipated manning requirements. Once
these individuals are recruited, the problem becomes one of
influencing the best people to remain in the service in
order to maintain an effective force structure. Successful
retention programs would benefit the services in at least
two important respects: they would increase the overall
quality of the senior officer corps and also help to create
a military that is most effective, in terms of cost as well
as action.
Before World War II the military used a promotion system
based primarily on seniority. Under this system an officer
could be promoted only if an officer senior in rank either
resigned or died. This resulted in junior officers
remaining in their current ranks with little chance of
promotion and a relatively old senior officer corps. The
Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was enacted to remedy this
situation. It established a requirement that officers who
twice fail to be selected for promotion to 0-3 or 0-4 be
separated from the service, and that those who fail to be
selected for 0-5 or 0-6 be required to retire. The Defense
Office Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) has expanded
on this by allowing for officers who twice fail to be
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selected for 0—5 to be separated before retirement. This
new system allows for the separation of marginal performers
in order to create openings for upcoming junior officers and
also motivate junior officers to improve their performance
as they are now competing for a limited number of
promotions. [Ref. 1: pp. 29-31, 34] Reducing the number of
0-3s and 0-4s lost to voluntary separation would increase
the pool of potential selectees for promotion. Assuming the
quality of performance of these officers is randomly
distributed (i.e., non-careerists include both high and low
quality officers) , this would result in more higher quality
officers being available for selection.
The recent trend towards tighter budgets under the
shadow of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) has made cost reduction
a major consideration in the establishment of policy. In
order to maintain required manning levels at minimum cost,
the question becomes one of retention versus replacement.
Although the military's retirement system is increasingly
coming under attack as being too generous and costly, it has
been shown that it is less costly to retain an officer for a
20-year career than it is to recruit and train a new officer
only to lose that training and experience every six to 10
years [Ref. 2: pp. 18-19]. As the overall quality of the
officer corps increases, presumably they will, in aggregate,
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increase productivity, produce better decisions, and, in
general, be more efficient. and effective.
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to identify
factors which contribute to the career decision made by Army
and Marine Corps officers. This knowledge could then be
exploited to influence policy decisions which would increase
retention and result in lower recruiting and training costs,
higher quality leadership, and ultimately in increased
combat readiness.
A. BACKGROUND
Before attempting to identify specific factors which
influence an individual's career decision, it is worthwhile
to become familiar with some of the motivational theories
currently being used to explain human behavior. An
understanding of these theories will give an appreciation of
the general underlying factors which form the foundation of
the decision either to remain in the military for a 20-year
career or to look for work in the civilian market.
One of the most well-known theories of motivation is the
need hierarchy theory developed by Abraham Maslow (1970)
.
According to this theory, all behavior is motivated by
certain needs. All needs can be categorized into one of
five types. Physiological needs are concerned with survival
and include food, water, and air. Safety needs are
concerned with self-preservation and include freedom from
threat or danger. Social needs are concerned with one's
12
association with other people "and include companionship and
friendship. Self-esteem is concerned with one's sense of
adequacy and includes self-confidence, respect, and
recognition. Self-actualization is the need to realize
one's full- potential or to "be all that you can be."
According to Maslow, these needs are characteristics of all
people and are related to each other in a hierarchy with
physiological needs at the bottom and self-actualization at
the top. Behavior is influenced by the lowest level of
unsatisfied needs. Once a need is satisfied, Maslow finds,
it no longer influences behavior, but then the next higher
level need takes over. Thus, behavior is a series of
attempts to satisfy increasing levels of needs. [Ref. 3:
pp. 35-58] If the military does not provide an avenue for
the satisfaction of one's needs, particularly the higher-
level needs, that individual will choose to leave the




proposed by Adams (1965), concerns
social comparisons and is known as the "equity theory."
According to this theory, motivation is based on how an
individual sees his own situation compared to his perception
of that of other people. The individual brings certain
assets ("inputs") to his job, such as education, experience,
effort, and so on. As a result of his work, he receives
certain benefits ("outputs"), such as pay, working
conditions, recognition, and the like. Assuming people can
13
quantify these factors into a common scale of units, the
individual relates his inputs to his outputs. He then
compares his ratio with his perception of the ratio of other
people. If he feels his own ratio of inputs to outputs is
50/50 and the ratio of another person is 75/75 then the
ratios are the same ("equity") and there is no problem.
However, if he perceives the other's ratio as 50/75, then
this situation is deemed unfair ("inequity") , tension will
result, and the individual becomes motivated to reduce this
tension. This could be accomplished by reducing inputs,
such as effort, or by leaving the job (or military service)
to seek equity. [Ref. 4: pp. 272-287, 292]
"Expectancy theory," made popular by Victor Vroom
(1964), describes motivation in terms of "valence,"
"instrumentality," and "expectancy." Valence is the
individual's feelings about the outcome of a job. The
outcome, and so the valence, could be positive (such as a
pay raise) or negative (such as termination) . Of course, if
the individual, for some reason, wanted to be fired, then
termination would have a positive valence. If he is
indifferent to an outcome, his valence would be zero.
Instrumentality is the perceived relationship between
performance and outcome. If the individual believes good
work leads to a promotion, his instrumentality will be high;
but, if promotions are given based only on seniority,
instrumentality will be low. Expectancy is the perceived
14
relationship between effort and performance. If it seems
like your performance remains low no matter how hard you
try, then your expectancy will be low. These factors are
used in the following equation: force = f[E(IV; I;)], where
force is the amount of motivation, E is the expectancy, V is
the valence, and I is the instrumentality. 1 If an
individual sees no relationship between personal effort and
performance (low expectancy), believes there is no
relationship between how well he performs and the acquired
outcomes (low instrumentality) , or feels indifferent or
negatively about available outcomes (low valence), then
motivation will be low. [Ref. 5: pp. 15-19] If the
individual believes the outcomes available from a civilian
job are more valuable than those available from the
military, believes performance in a civilian job will have a
higher impact on these outcomes, or believes there will be a
greater relationship between effort and performance in a
civilian job, he will be motivated to leave the service.
Goal setting, according to Edwin Locke (1968) , assumes
people behave consciously and rationally. People
consciously set goals, and these goals are the basis for
motivation and so direct behavior. The more difficult and
1 Vroom actually breaks the process down into two
propositions: Vj = f [ £ (VK IJk ) ] and force = f[Z (E^-V; ) ] where
Vj = valence of outcome j, Iji< = instrumentality of outcome j
for attainment of outcome k, and E/j = expectancy that act i
will be followed by outcome j.
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specific the goal, the greate~r the motivation to work
towards this goal, so long as the goal is not deemed to be
so difficult as to be unobtainable, in which case it would
be rejected. [Ref. 6: pp. 183-186] According to this view,
if an officer decided that a civilian job would provide the
best means to achieve important goals, the officer would
then be motivated to leave the military.
Many previous studies, which are reviewed in the
following section, have found that retention is highly
correlated with job satisfaction. In light of this, a brief
review of some of the theories of job satisfaction is
included.
Comparison processes theories say that job satisfaction
is based on a comparison of what an individual wants from
his job and what he receives. The smaller the difference
between these, the greater his satisfaction will be. Some
researchers view these "wants" as based on needs [Ref. 7:
pp. 383-384]. Others believe they are based on learned
values [Ref. 8: pp. 316-319; Ref. 9: pp. 480-482]. Since
everyone has the same needs, differences in satisfaction
from similar jobs are attributed to differing strengths of
these needs between different people. Values, which are
what a person desires or considers valuable, are acquired
and so are obviously different for different people. The
extent to which an individual's needs or values are met
determines his job satisfaction.
16
Herzberg's (1959) two-factor theory divides all job-
related variables into two classes. The first class,
satisfiers or "motivators" (content factors) are factors
which contribute to job satisfaction and include
achievement, recognition, and responsibility. Dissatisf iers
or "hygienes" (context factors) , on the other hand, are
factors which contribute to job dissatisfaction and include
company policy, salary, and working conditions. If a lot of
content factors are available in a job, then that job will
provide individuals with a high degree of satisfaction;
however, if these factors are absent, rather than feeling
dissatisfied, employees will feel indifferent toward the
job. At the same time, if context factors are good, then
employees will feel indifferent; but, if they are bad, then
employees will feel dissatisfied. [Ref. 10: pp. 113-119]
Although these theories are varied and often quite
involved, they can be simplified and related to one another.
The need hierarchy, comparison processes, and two-factor
theories are basically concerned with satisfying extrinsic
and intrinsic needs or values. The equity, expectancy, and
goal setting theories are concerned with meeting
expectations of receiving extrinsic or intrinsic rewards.
The primary differences lie in the internal mechanisms which
convert these external stimuli (rewards) into a behavior.
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B. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many studies have been conducted to try to determine
factors related to turnover and retention. The. services
currently give exit interviews to officers choosing to leave
the service to determine their reasons for leaving. While
this is important, it answers only half the question. What
we also need to ask is why people stay . This may not
necessarily be the opposite of why people leave. Flowers
and Hughes (1973) did'a study on civilian employees based on
406 questionnaires administered to employees from three
companies. They found that retention is related to job
satisfaction and environmental pressure. Job satisfaction
is based on intrinsic factors, such as recognition and
responsibility. Environmental pressure is based on
extrinsic factors, such as pay and job location. If job
satisfaction is high, then employees will stay because they
want to; but, if it is low, then they will stay only if they
feel they have to because of environmental pressure. While
these people are still on the job, this is not necessarily
good for the company. Since these employees are
dissatisfied with their jobs but feel trapped, they may
become unproductive or "do exactly what I'm told and no
more." They may even decide to "get even" with their
company or instigate unionization. [Ref. 11: pp. 49-52]
This study indicates that both intrinsic and extrinsic
18
factors" will motivate employees to stay on the job, but
extrinsic factors alone will' not keep them satisfied.
Another study, by Wernimont (1966), showed that both
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards could generate job
satisfaction. In this study, each of 50 accountants and 82
engineers who worked for one of nine Midwestern industries
were asked to describe an event that had occurred on the job
that made him happy with his job and then check one of a
pair of statements (50 pairs total) which best described how
he felt in that situation. Each pair included an intrinsic
and an extrinsic factor which could be related to the
incident. Each respondent was also asked to do the same for
an event that made him unhappy with his job. The results
showed that intrinsic factors were chosen 60 percent of the
time in both situations. Wernimont concludes that intrinsic
factors contribute to satisfaction and lack of intrinsic
factors leads to dissatisfaction. Extrinsic factors also
contribute to both, but to a lesser degree. He adds that an
employee's expectations about what his job involves and the
rewards he should get are important; and, if these
expectations are not met, he will be dissatisfied. [Ref.
12: pp. 48-50]
Porter and Steers (1973) , in a review of 15 studies
conducted by other researchers, conclude that turnover is
inversely related to overall job satisfaction. They expand-H
on this by viewing job satisfaction as "the sum total of an
19
findividual's met expectations on the job" [Ref. 13: p. 169].
The closer the job comes to meeting these expectations, the
greater the individual's job satisfaction. It is proposed
that four general categories of factors are involved in job
satisfaction: organization-wide factors (pay and promotion
policies) ; immediate work environment factors (supervision
and worker relations) ; job-related factors (the nature of
the job); and personal factors (age, seniority, family
considerations). In addition, it is noted that these
expectations are concerned with both intrinsic and extrinsic
factors. This breakdown attempts to go beyond the well-
established fact that individuals who are satisfied with
their jobs tend to remain in their jobs and attempts to
determine what specifically makes an individual satisfied.
[Ref 13: pp. 154-172]
There are also many studies concerned specifically with
turnover in the military. Githens (1966) studied the job
factors that were considered to be important to NROTC
commissioned officers with three through 13 years of
service. A list of 25 career values was given to each
officer, and he was asked to rate each value in the
following manner: on a five-point scale signifying how
important that value was personally, on a five-point scale
indicating the expected likelihood of receiving that reward
while in the Navy, and whether he felt there was a greater
probability of receiving that reward in the Navy as compared
20
to a civilian job. A total of 644 officers were involved in
the study. The analysis determined that content factors
were considered more important than context factors. In
addition, it was found that, although values which were
considered to be easily obtainable in the Navy were also
considered to be more obtainable in the Navy than in a
civilian job, the civilian market was considered to be
slightly better at delivering the rewards which were
considered most important. The following five values were
rated high in importance but low in likelihood of being
obtained in the Navy: satisfactory home life, full use of
abilities, work under consistent and intelligent personnel
policies, feelings of accomplishment, and success through
ability alone. These values are concerned primarily with
ontent factors. [Ref. 14: pp. 5-7]
Dudley and Hoyle (1979) conducted a study similar to
Githens 1 to find what types of rewards Army and Marine Corps
officers valued and how these affected retention. In this
study, 92 Army and 119 Marine Corps officers, in the ranks
0-1 through 0-4, were given a list of 41 rewards and asked
to rank each on a one-to-five scale with respect to their
importance to the officer personally, the expected
probability of receiving that reward during his career, and
the influence of each on his decision to stay in or leave
the service. The results for the Army were similar to those
of the Marine Corps. They found that while extrinsic
21
&factors were important to the officers, intrinsic factors
were considered much more important. They also found that
the factors the officers considered most important were also
most important in determining career intentions. In
addition, the expected probability of receiving these
rewards was highly correlated with the officers career
-
intentions. [Ref. 15: pp. 62-67]
Hayden (1985) used the 1978 DoD Survey to determine
factors influencing the career decision of Army officers
with one through three years of service. The officers were
divided into three occupational groups: combat arms, combat
support, and combat service support. Using regression
models and discriminate analysis with "expected years of
service" as the dependent variable, it was found that
overall satisfaction with military life was the most
important factor influencing retention. Beyond this, the
different occupational groups had different specific factors
affecting retention, but most were based on comparisons of
military with civilian life. [Ref. 15: 94-104] Other
studies using various sample groups and methods confirm the
importance of job satisfaction with respect to retention
[Ref. 17: p. 3; Ref. 18: p. 72].
The main point to be emphasized from reviewing these
studies is that retention is based largely on job
satisfaction, which is a function of the degree to which
22
expectations of intrinsic and, to a lesser degree, extrinsic
rewards are realized.
In addition to the plethora of studies relating
retention with satisfaction, there are many studies which
incorporate economic and demographic factors into the career
decision, Stolzenberg and Winkler (1983) reviewed various
studies published through 1981 and attempted to consolidate
the findings into a comprehensive picture of why people
quit. Although compensation is an important consideration,
it is, in general, not as important as a non-pecuniary
factor. Job security is also an important factor; the
higher the probability of being laid- of f the greater the
likelihood of quitting. At the same time, the higher the
unemployment rate, the less likely an individual is to quit.
Since unemployment and layoffs tend to go hand in hand, it
is difficult to distinguish which has the greater influence,
so a complete econometric model should include both
variables. However, a layoff in the military, in terms of a
reduction-in-force (RIF) or a twice fail-to-select, does not
appear to have a large influence on officer retention.
Although the authors are not convinced, they concede that it
is possible that good advancement opportunities will
contribute to increased retention. Adequate procedures for
resolving disputes with supervisors also contribute to
retention, as does education, age, length of service, and
lack of a spouse and dependents. Race and sex show mixed
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results. In some cases it appears that fear of
discrimination influences blacks and women to keep a job
once they have one; in others, their retention appears to be
lower due to the need to take care of children or because
race affects attitudes which contribute to dissatisfaction.
However, many of these differences may be due to
correlations between race/sex and other variables, such as
education. The authors conclude that if other variables are
held constant then race and sex do not influence retention.
Finally, as in the previously cited studies, it is noted
that met expectations and satisfaction are important
contributors toward retention. ~ [Ref . 19: pp. 17, 27-30, 35-
37, 47, 58, 61-63]
Mullens (1984) used a LOGIT model with data from the
June 1983 Medical Officer File, which contains individual
data on physicians who have left the Navy, are currently on
active duty, and are soon to come on active duty. The study
was confined to physicians who entered the Navy during or
prior to September 1981. The dependent variable was whether
or not the physician left the Navy in FY82. It was found
that a physician's specialty had a significant impact on the
decision to leave, with more specialized doctors tending to
stay in: psychiatrists were least likely to leave, whereas
general practitioners were most likely to leave. Physicians
with a service-specific qualification, such as flight
surgeons, which is not readily transferable to a civilian
24
job, are slightly less likely to leave the service. Another
factor influencing retention is where the officer is in his
career path. It is noted that there are two critical points
in an officer's career: the point when his obligated service




retirement benefits. As expected, officers who were at
these critical points in their career were more likely to
leave the Navy. Graduation from a foreign medical school
was found to influence individuals to stay in; however, it
is believed that these individuals feel the Navy offers
increased job security. Source of entry (commissioning
source) was also found to affect the decision, as was the
commissioned status (regular or reserve). Finally,
compensation, as a function of length of service, was
considered; however, the author concludes that if
compensation is increased, then retention will decrease
[Ref. 20: pp. 5-11]
Other studies exist which investigated other variables
along with those already mentioned. Braunstein (1974) found
that an individual would be more career-motivated if his
spouse had a good attitude toward the service [Ref. 21:
p. 36]. Daubert (1985) found that • individuals who are
overseas have a higher retention rate than those stationed
in the continental United States, but this may be due to the
expectation of less frequent moves, voluntary assignment
overseas (if the individual enjoys it), or trading a tour
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overseas now for a more desirable tour later (if the
individual does not enjoy it) [Ref. 22: pp. 38-39].
Estabrooks (1931) found that an officer's billet assignment
has a limited but definite impact on the career decision.
The influence may be through the desirability (for either
personal or career motivated reasons) of the new billet or
satisfaction with the detailing process [Ref. 23: pp. 61-
63] .
A more involved model, which was developed to model the
reenlistment decision made by Navy enlisted personnel, is
the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model (Warner and
Goldberg, 1984). The authors attempt to establish"a
relationship between pecuniary and non-pecuniary aspects of
a job. Basically, this is done by first estimating the
difference of the sum of the present values of an
individual's expected future military earnings for a
particular number of years (including retirement benefits)
and the sum of the present values of his expected civilian
wages over this same time period if he was to leave the
service. This figure is then divided by the sum of the
present values of a dollar received each year for the
designated period. This gives the individual's annualized
cost of leaving the military (ACOL). His ACOL is then
compared to his net preference for civilian life (the
•
difference betv/een the annual monetary equivalent of the
non-pecuniary aspects of a military job and that of a
26
civilian job) . If his ACOL is greater, the individual will
choose to reenlist. [Ref. 24: pp. 27-28]
Then, Warner and Goldberg set up a PR03IT model using
ACOL, marital status, and unemployment rates as independent
variables and the reenlistment decision as the dependent
variable. This was done in each of 16 occupational groups.
It was found that ACOL was a significant factor in
determining the reenlistment decision. Marital status was
also found to be significant; however, unlike Stolzenberg
and Winkler, the authors conclude that married individuals
are more likely to reenlist. The impact of unemployment was
less Certain: it was found to be significant in only about
half of the groups. [Ref. 24: pp. 31-33]
Gotz and McCall (1984) developed a retention model for
the Air Force which expands on the ACOL model. Their
"dynamic retention model" assumes individuals will make
retention decisions based on which alternative (stay in or
leave the service) offers the greatest expected payoff.
Factors which contribute to the determination of these
payoffs are promotion probabilities, military pay,
retirement benefits, severance pay, expected civilian pay,
net monetary equivalent of non-pecuniary aspects of service
life (military less civilian aspects) , and the monetary
equivalent of "transient shocks" (unexpected events which
may influence, either positively or negatively, a retention
decision). Future payoffs of each of these must be
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discounted to their present values, except for transient
shocks which, by definition, are not expected. Variables
which contributed to the determination of retention rates
are fiscal year in which the individual's service obligation
ends, number of years of initial obligation, aeronautical
rating (equivalent to occupational specialty), source of
commission, LOS, component (regular or reserve) , rank, and
year of service in which promoted to that rank. While
individual components of the model were not tested for
significance, the model as a whole was found to accurately
predict retention rates. [Ref. 25: pp. 1, 3-4, 8-11, 17,
25-27]
In reviewing these studies, it is obvious that there are
a myriad of factors which contribute to the career decision.
In addition to those cited, there are, undoubtedly, many
others which have been overlooked and still others which
have yet to be discovered. However, in examining this list,
it is noted that all relevant factors fall into one of only
three broad categories: personal, intrinsic, and extrinsic
factors. Centering this study around the concept of these
categories will simplify the approach to determining which
factors are most influential and may help in the
determination of other potentially influential factors which




The data used in this thesis are from the 1935 DoD
Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. This survey was
conducted by the Defense Manpov/er Data Center (DMDC) for the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force'
Management and Personnel) . It was administered between
January and June 1985 (with most responses collected during
March) and included active duty military personnel stationed
world-wide who were on duty 30 September 1984. It was
conducted in order to establish a cross sectional data base
from which military policy issues could be studied. [Ref.
26: pp. 1-1 to 2-9]
This study is confined to Army and Marine Corps officers
who are between their fourth-year and twelfth-year of
service, since this is the time period in which most
individuals make career decisions. It has been shown that
an officer's original career intentions generally have only
a slight relationship to later career plans [Ref. 27: p.
272], and the tendency to leave a job decreases as age and
length of service increase [Ref. 28: p. 13]. 2 Warrant
officers and individuals holding less than a bachelor's
7 Only four out of 1620 Army officers and 14 out of
1256 Marine Corps officers with over 12 years of service who
answered the survey expressed an intention of leaving the
service before retirement.
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degree are not included. The Army and Marine Corps are being
studied and compared because of the common assumption that
both branches perform similar missions. Both are concerned
with fighting a war on land: fighting on a traditional
battlefield, utilizing armor and artillery (although the
Marines, perhaps, to a lesser extent), conducting amphibious
assaults, and such. In the public's eye, the primary
difference is that the Marines are "tougher" whereas the
Army is often thought of as the "branch of last resort" if
an individual is unqualified to enlist in any other branch.
In addition to looking at the Army and Marine Corps as a
whole, each branch is" divided into DoD occupational
specialties; however, due to limited sample sizes, the only
specialty areas that will be considered are the tactical
operations, administrative, non-occupational, and medical
specialties. Since the Marine Corps depends upon the Navy
to supply medical support, only Army medical specialists are
included.
Individuals are considered to be either careerists or
non-careerists based on their response to the question,
"When you finally leave the military, how many total years
of service do you expect to have?" (question ID: 027E25) .
Those who answered 20 years or more are considered to be
"careerists;" those v/ho answered 19 years or less are
considered to be "non-careerists."
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Several determinants of the career choice decision are
identified from the survey. Variables are selected based on
the literature review cited above and fall into one of three
categories: personal, intrinsic, and extrinsic variables.
Personal variables include AGE, SEX, RACE, education (EDUC)
,
marital status (MARRIED), number of dependents (DEPEND),
commissioning source (COMM) , and length of service (LOS)
.
Intrinsic variables include the probability of promotion
(PROM) , military life as expected (EXPECT) , and satisfaction
with current job (as a proxy for satisfaction with the
detailing process; DETAIL) . In addition, two variables are
derived using factor analysis. These variables incorporate
various aspects of "satisfaction" variables with non-
pecuniary aspects of military life. These aspects include
satisfaction with personal freedom, environment for the
family, frequency of moves, opportunity to serve your
country, working environment, job training, and job
security. Factor analysis, or more specifically principle
components analysis, is useful for establishing the
existence of a pattern of relationships among a set of
variables. First, the correlation between the given
variables is examined. These variables are then reduced
into a series of uncorrelated variables or factors, each of
which explains a portion of the variance of the data.
Finally, these factors are rotated in order to transform
them into simpler and more meaningful factors. The first
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factor generated explains the most variance of the data as a
whole, the next the second most, and so on. [Ref. 29: pp.
469-473] The first factor, designated "JOB", is heavily
weighted by variables concerned primarily with the job
itself. The second factor, designated "FAMILY", is heavily
weighted by variables concerned with effects of military
life on the individual's family. Extrinsic variables
include total military pay (TOTPAY) , probability of finding
a good civilian job (CIVJOB), and satisfaction with
retirement benefits (RETIRE). Other variables which are
deemed important but are excluded due to a lack of data
include unemployment rates at home of record, adequate
procedures for resolving disputes with supervisors,
component (regular or reserve) , military/civilian pay ratio,
and number of years of initial obligation. Whether or not a
spouse agrees with an individual's career plans is not
included since it applies only to married personnel.
The variables are defined as follows. AGE is simply the
respondent's age in years. SEX is a dichotomous (dummy)
variable which equals one for females and zero for males.
RACE is captured by three dummy variables: BLACK, Hispanic
(HISP) , and other non-white (OTHER) ; whites are the omitted
category. EDUC is a dummy variable that equals one for
either a master's or doctoral degree and zero for a
bachelor's degree. MARRIED is also a dummy variable with
married equals one and not married equals zero. DEPEND is
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the number of dependents the respondent has excluding his
spouse. Commissioning source (COMM) uses four dummy
variables: officer candidate school (OCS) , reserve officer
training corps (ROTC) , direct commission (DIRECT) , and a
health professional scholarship or medic specialist program
(MED) ; academy graduates are the omitted category. LOS is
months of service. The probability of promotion (PROM) and
probability of finding a good civilian job (CIVJOB) are
measured on a scale from zero to ten, with zero equal to "no
chance" and ten equal to "certain." EXPECT is used on a
one to five scale with one equal to "strongly agree" and
five equal to "strongly disagree." DETAIL, RETIRE, and the
seven "satisfaction with" variables included in the JOB and
FAMILY factors are measured on a one to five scale with
"very satisfied" equal to one and "very dissatisfied" equal
to five. TOTPAY is total military income in dollars. The
variables are listed in Table 1 for ease of reference and
discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.
In an attempt to clear up some problems which surfaced
in this model, a second model was estimated which modified
the first in three respects. AGE was deleted since it is
highly correlated with LOS, and LOS appears to have a more
significant influence on the career decision. MARRIED and
DEPEND were combined into one variable, total number of
dependents (TOTDEP), which is simply the number of






BLACK = black (RACE)
HISP = Hispanic (RACE)
OTHER = other (RACE)
EDUC = education
MARRIED =- marital status
DEPEND = number of dependents
TOTDEP = total number of dependents
OCS = officer candidate school (COMM)
ROTC = reserve officer training corps
DIRECT = direct commission (COMM)
MED = medical program (COMM)
LOS = length of service
PROM = promotion probability
EXPECT = military life as expected
DETAIL = satisfaction with current job (detailing process)
JOB = satisfaction with job related factors
FAMILY = satisfaction with family related factors
TOTPAY = total military pay
SLJPPAY = supplemental pay
CIVJOB = probability of finding a good civilian job
RETIRE = satisfaction with retirement benefits
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Finally, another extrinsic variable, supplemental pay
(SUPPAY) was included. This was done in an attempt to
determine v/hether family income other than military pay
might account for TOTPAY results which are counterintuitive.
One of the basic assumptions of multiple regression is
that there is no relationship between any of the independent
variables; a change in one should not have any effect on any
of the others. Of course, in reality, this is very seldom
the case; however, if the correlation is not very strong,
its effects may be overlooked. On the other hand, if two
variables are highly correlated then the coefficients of the
model may be unstable and unreliable. [Ref. 30: pp. 87-90]
This situation, known as multicollinearity, may, to some
extent, be avoided by using a correlation matrix in order to
anticipate or detect potential problems. At the same time,
a complete econometric model should include all relevant
variables; at this point a judgment call must be made in
order to balance multicollinearity v/ith completeness.
Another use of the correlation matrix is to predict the
direction of the relationship between the dependent and
independent variables. If the matrix shows them to be
positively correlated, then the regression model should not
show a negative correlation. However, this is not
considered to be a serious problem for coefficients which
are determined to be insignificant.
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Data were analyzed on the IBM 3033 mainframe computer
using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSSx) program.
Logistic regression analysis (LOGIT) was used to
investigate the impact of the explanatory variables and to
identify those which have the strongest influence on the
career decision [Ref. 31: pp. 602-619]. The dependent
variable in the LOGIT model is the careerist/non-careerist
decision, measured as the log of the odds of being a
careerist.
Coefficients of continuous variables were converted to
elasticities. This was done by using the following formula:
elasticity = coeff * X(i) * (1-p)
,
where elasticity = elasticity at the mean
coeff = variable coefficient estimated in the model
X(i) = the mean value of variable i
p = the probability of being a careerist (actual
number of careerists divided by the total group size) [Ref.
32: p. 189; Ref. 30: p. 91], The effects of dichotomous
variables were determined in the following manner. First,
P(0) (predicted probability of being a careerist) was found
when the variable in question equals zero and using the mean
values of all other independent variables. Since the model
gives us the log of the odds (ln(P/l-P)), the antilog of the
results was found and then P(0) was determined. Then P(l)
was found v/hen the variable equals one while all else
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remains constant. The difference between P(l) and P(0) -will
be the effect of the dichotomous independent variable on. the
probability of being a careerist at the mean. The mean
values of each variable are shown in Appendix B.
As an indication of the validity of the results, the
models were used to predict the probability of an individual
desiring a 20-year career, and this was compared with his
stated intentions using crosstabulations. Specifically, the
model was manually placed back into the computer program
using the COMPUTE command. Two different cutoff points were
used for determining whether an individual would be
categorized as a careerist or non-careerist. First, .5 was
used with individuals whose P was .5 or greater being
careerists. In addition, the mean value of P was determined
for each group and used as the cutoff value in an attempt to
improve correct prediction rates.
To compare the two branches and the various occupational
specialties within each branch, a Chow test was performed on
the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of each group
[Ref. 33: pp. 173-175]. OLS was used in order to simplify
the calculations and is justified because the purpose of the
Chow test is to determine whether two groups are equivalent
and can be treated as a single group. While specific
parameters may be slightly different than what would be




Tables 2 through 10 show the results of the LOGIT
regressions for Model 1 and Tables 11 through 19 for Model
2. Sample sizes of each group are as follows: all Army,
1161; Army tactical operations, 292; Army medical, 191; Army
administrative, 158; Army non-occupational, 140; all Marine
Corps, 926; Marine Corps tactical operations, 335; Marine
Corps administrative, 117; and Marine Corps non-
occupational, 162. Since the SPSSx program divides the
LOGIT equation by two and adds five to the intercept [Ref.
29: pp. 605-606], the figures in these tables were derived
from the output by subtracting five from the intercept and
then multiplying this and all coefficients by two. The
variables found to have a statistically significant impact
on career intentions are highlighted with asterisks.
The last column in each table shows the elasticities of
continuous independent variables and effects on the
probability of being a careerist of dichotomous independent
variables. For example, from Table 2 it can be seen that
for all Army officers, if the probability of promotion were
increased by ten percent, then the probability of an
individual being a careerist would increase by 3.29 percent.
Likewise, if an Army officer were female, the probability of
being a careerist is .022 less than that of a male officer.
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Tables 20 through 55 show the results of the predictions
based on the estimated models, and these results are
summarized in Tables 56 through 59. As shown in Tables 56
and 58, if .5 is used as the cutoff point, the prediction
tables show a fairly accurate overall prediction rate and an
excellent correct prediction rate for careerists, but this
is accomplished at the expense' of correctly predicting non-
careerists. Using .5 as the cutoff value essentially
predicts that everyone will be a careerist and does little
to isolate the non-careerists. However, as shown in Tables
57 and 59, using the mean value of the predicted
probabilities of being a careerist as the cutoff value
somewhat decreases the proportion of careerists correctly
predicted but greatly increases the proportion of non-
careerists correctly predicted.
Table 60 shows the results of the Chow test. From this
table it can be seen that all Army and all Marine Corps are
significantly different from each other and cannot be
treated as a single group. Likewise, Army and Marine Corps
tactical operations are also significantly different.
Within branches,
. statistically significant differences are
found only for the Army medical and tactical operations
groups and the Army medical and administrative groups.
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TABLE 2





(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept .15130 6.833
personal:
AGE .00164 .039 .006
SEX -.48132* -1.815 -,022#
BLACK .07102 .200 ,003#
HISP -.58876 -.992 -.031*
OTHER -.43430 -.806 -.0211
EDUC .11258 .366 .005#
HARRIED .09830 .365 .004#
DEPEND .06602 .608 .008
ocs .88732 1.394 .035#
ROTC .53394 1.603 ,024#
DIRECT .45842 1.051 .022#
MED -1.11446** -2.400 -.105#
LOS .04090*** 7.243 .436
intrinsic: -
PROM .36060*** 6.699 .329
EXPECT .10070 .727 .024
DETAIL -.36504*** -3.246 -.090
JOB -.28076* -1.853 -.083
FAMILY -.36038*** -2.768 -.118
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00004** -2.027 -.120
CIVJOB -.07430 -1.143 -.067
RETIRE -.12756 -.987 -.033
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
1161 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -2.72206 1.601
personal:
AGE .09370 .491 .222
SEX -1.55320 -1.605 -.100#
BLACK -.51674 -.628 -.019$
HISP -1.74588 -1.264 -.121#
OTHER .53 87 8 .349 ,012#
EDUC .83612 .624 .021* -
MARRIED .67094 .962 .026#
DEPEND -.13762 -.519 -.013
OCS .44638 .412 .028*
ROTC 1.35922* 1.907 ,060#
DIRECT -.38558 -.221 -.034#
MED .00000
LOS -.00604 -.303 -.044
intrinsic:
PROM .46436*** 2.802 .312
EXPECT -.14436 -.407 -.025
DETAIL -.65146*** -2.605 -.112
JOB -.27634 -.751 -.055
FAMILY -.02532 -.083 -.006
extrinsic:
TOTPAY .00012 1.062 .242
CIVJOB -.09678 -.588 -.059
RETIRE -.49108 -1.602 -.091
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
292 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept .40570 3.152
personal: -
AGE -.09050 -1.425 .753
SEX .19320 .307 .023#
BLACK .05676 .071 .006#
HISP -3.72782 -1.555 -.730#
OTHER -.75450 -.853 -.105*
EDUC .07214 .110 .008#
MARRIED -.20990 -.341 -.024#
DEPEND .24680 1.160 .078
OCS .00000
ROTC -.26536 -.235 -.030#
DIRECT .44284 .486 .038#
MED -1.36762- -1.418 -.221#
LOS .06638*** 5.030 1.476
intrinsic:
PROM .32962*** 2.825 .610
EXPECT .16760 .589 .092
DETAIL -.42508 -1.524 -.247
JOB -.11298 -.316 -.082
FAMILY -.61750** -2.056 -.430
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00002 -.704 -.160
CIVJOB -.11912 -.815 -.258
RETIRE .27886 .872 .163
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
tf = effect on P (dummy variable)
191 valid observations






LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratic i elasticity
intercept -10.72616 -.054
personal:
AGE .30574 1.110 .730
SEX -1.91884 -1.576 -.014#
BLACK -2.31496* -1.733 -.030#
HISP 2.31370 .089 .003#
OTHER -2.84836 -1.051 -.053#
EDUC .02194 .020 • 001#
" MARRIED -.67800 -.611 -.003#
DEPEND .17952 .355 .014
OCS 4.89414 .364 .004#
ROTC -.85004 -.333 -.003#
DIRECT -1.70068 -.621 - -.019#
MED .00000
LOS .01232 .350 .095
intrinsic:
PROM .98848*** 3.273 .625
EXPECT -.71940 -1.322 -.117
DETAIL .73732 1.148 .119
JOB .26466 .498 .053
FAMILY .04406 .067 .009
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00018 -.375 -.352
CIVJOB -.11916 -.431 -.070
RETIRE 1.30950* 1.871 .235
-
* = signif:Leant at p = . 10
** = significant at p = . 05
*** = significant at p = . 01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
158 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -15.65416 -.539
personal:
AGE .49198* 1.667 1.600
SEX .25270 .202 .001*
BLACK 7.22466 .442 ,008#
HISP 5.94032 .201 .008#
OTHER -1.40266 -.392 -.023#
EDUC .46884 .285 ,002#
MARRIED 2.24362 1.538 .021#
DEPEND -.92514 -1.356 -.108
OCS 1.28560 .058 .003#
ROTC .20318 .182 .0011
DIRECT -1.79884 -.969- -.0171
MED -3.12834 -1.569 -.071#
LOS .04832* 1.718 .489
intrinsic:
PROM .74586** 2.371 .677
EXPECT .36198 .390 .083
DETAIL .00216 .003 .001
JOB -1.23626 -1.560 -.318
FAMILY .09782 .162 .033
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00006 -.552 -.167
CIVJOB -.29930 -.770 -.267
RETIRE -.15672 -.335 -.038
* = significant at p = . 10
** = significant at p = . 05
*** = significant at p = . 01
# = effect on P (dummy variabL2)
140 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)




AGE .11660 1.631 .512
SEX -.83412*** -2.994 -.075#
BLACK .75372 1.220 .039#
HISP -.50352 -.842 -.044#
OTHER -.69396 -1.061 -.066#
EDUC -.15622 -.475 -.012#
MARRIED .31794 1.225 .018*
DEPEND -.11598 -1.028 -.017
OCS -.49652* -1.785 -.038#
ROTC -.26426 -.922 -.018#
DIRECT 7.40824 .168 .066#
MED .00000
LOS .02522*** 3.658 .345
intrinsic:
PROM .20632*** 4.030 .244
EXPECT -.39664*** -3.020 -.122
DETAIL -.33476*** -3.430 -.101
JOB -.12964 -.936 -.049
FAMILY -.17126 -1.379 -.073
extrinsic:
TOTPAY .00002 .496 .078
CIVJOB -.04230 -.680 -.052
RETIRE -.21134* -1.714 -.073
* = significant at p .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
926 valid observations
source: derived from data in the
and Enlisted Personnel
1985 DoD Survey of Officer
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TABLE 8
LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -6.70763 .845
personal:
AGE .31716** 2.072 1.436
SEX -1.96662* -1.943 -.206#
BLACK 9.77844 .138 .047#
HISP -.95776 -1.07 8 -.067#
OTHER -.98994 -.970 -.070#
EDUC -.26186 -.324 -.013*
MARRIED .90344* 1.844 ,051#
DEPEND -.42820* -1.904 -.069
ocs -1.19046** -2.223 -.061#
ROTC -.72318 -1.508 -.029#
DIRECT .00000
MED .00000
LOS .04824*** 2.982 .673
intrinsic:
PROM .14380 1.524 .175
EXPECT -.28954 -1.187 -.094
DETAIL -.32788* -1.841 -.101
JOB -.24628 -.970 -.099
FAMILY -.14874 -.714 -.067
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00006 -1.063 -.259
CIVJOB -.08382 -.681 -.106
RETIRE -.07420 -.327 -.028
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
335 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept 2.39174 2.055
personal:
AGE -.04910 -.237 -.243
SEX -.73074 -.877 -,063#
BLACK .76422 .632 .059#
HISP 7.51656 .075 .118#
OTHER -1.24254 -.490 -.198#
EDUC .40628 .528 • 034#
MARRIED -.24422 -.310 -.021*
DEPEND -.19792 -.773 -.026
ocs -.35068 -.480 -.031#
ROTC -.26250 -.222 -.023#
DIRECT --1. 08506 -.008 -.130#
MED .00000
LOS .05482** 2.424 .851
intrinsic:
PROM .22356 1.145 .294
EXPECT -.58976 -1.036 -.190
DETAIL -.14966 -.453 -.051
JOB .10408 .245 .043
FAMILY .13050 .332 .058
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00018 -.755 -.746
CIVJOB .10512 .632 .141
RETIRE -.22486 -.619 -.086
* = significant at p = .10
** = signif.icant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variabl e)
117 valid iDbservations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept 5.90008 2.746
personal:
AGE -.08918 -.393 -.345
SEX -.99046 -1.008 -.049#
BLACK 8.38940 .343 .052*
HISP -.65826 -.355 -.044#
OTHER .00000
EDUC -1.72844 -1.489 -.120#
MARRIED .92654 1.076 .041*
DEPEND -.03094 -.078 -.004
OCS -.04238 -.033 -.001*
ROTC -1.33458 -1.614 -.065#
DIREC-T .00000
MED .00000
LOS .06460** 2.229 .770
intrinsic:
PROM .30262* 1.955 .316
EXPECT -.51616 -1.310 -.139
DETAIL -.38502 -1.368 -.106
JOB -.73324* -1.689 -.252
FAMILY -.35950 -.812 -.134
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00010 -.836 -.355
CIVJOB -.01582 -.094 -.017
RETIRE -.44028 -1.186 -.132
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
162 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL ARMY
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept .23030 9.324
personal:
SEX -.45740 -1.626 -.020#
BLACK .05894 .165 ,002#
HISP -.59108 -.998 -.031#
OTHER -.45040 -.83 8 -,022#
EDUC .12990 .432 .005#
TOTDEP .07708 .920 .016
OCS .88608 1.410 ,034#
ROTC .53614 1.609 .024#
DIRECT .'45770 1.097 .021*
MED -1.11266** -2.396 -,102#
LOS .04096*** 7.834 - .436
intrinsic:
PROM .35972*** 6.768 .328
EXPECT .10510 .752 .025
DETAIL -.36608*** -3.260 -.091
JOB -.28170* -1.863 -.0 83
FAMILY -.36290*** -2.790 -.119
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00004** -2.195 -.120
SUPPAY .00000 -.256 .000
CIVJOB -.07420 -1.143 -.066
RETIRE -.12800 -.992 -.033
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
1161 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -.95602 2.728
personal:
SEX -1.56450 -1.447 -.073#
BLACK -.39386 -.479 -.0101
HISP -1.65044 -1.219 -.081#
OTHER .49300 .331 .008#
EDUC .82378 .615 i015#
TOTDEP .05408 .280 .009
ocs . .52642 .501 .023#
ROTC 1.33224* 1.897 .042#
DIRECT -.15842 -.096 -.009#
MED .00000
LOS .00098 ' .069 .007
intrinsic:
PROM .45628*** 2.741 .306
EXPECT -.14578 -.410 -.025
DETAIL -.66062*** -2.721 -.114
JOB -.22398 -.623 -.045
FAMILY -.01016 -.034 -.002
extrinsic:
TOTPAY .00016 1.308 .322
SUPPAY .00000 .252 .000
CIVJOB -.10603 -.654 -.065
RETIRE -.49960 -1.619 -.107
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
292 valid observations
source: derived from data in the 1985
and Enlisted Personnel
DoD Survey of Officer
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TABLE 13
LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -2.16908 3.066
personal:
SEX .47134 .722 .066#
BLACK -.17096 -.212 -.022#
HISP -2.88896 -1.2 87 -.605#
OTHER -1.07044 -1.197 -.181#
EDUC .09756 .151 .013#
TOTDEP .20838 1.230 .103
OCS .00000
ROTC .20346 .175 .024#
DIRECT .43530 .491 .048#
MED -.98758 -1.056 -.173#
LOS .06210*** 4.879 1.381
intrinsic:
PROM .36002*** 3.146 .667
EXPECT .21342 .754 .117
DETAIL -.45568* -1.649 -.265
JOB -.03880 -.112 -.028
FAMILY -.66754** -2.126 -.465
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00006 -1.494 -.479
SUPPAY -.00002 -1.280 -.080
CIVJOB -.10348 -.721 -.224
RETIRE .30272 .961 .177
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
191 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -3.25282 .633
personal:
SEX -2.27226* -1.735 -,020#
BLACK -2.58654** -2.066 -,043#
HISP 2.58522 .101 .003#
OTHER -3.45354 -1.369 -.100#
EDUC .42084 .422 .0023
TOTDEP -.09176 -.249 -.012
OCS 5.74080 .444 .005#
ROTC -1.18762 -.520 -.011*
DIRECT -1.21070 -.488 -.011#
MED .00000
LOS .02238 .722 .172
intrinsic:
PROM .98910*** 3.349 .625
EXPECT -.74440 -1.303 -.121
DETAIL .96400 1.582 .156
JOB .16280 .321 .032
FAMILY -.04956 -.075 -.010
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00012 -.257 -.234
SUPPAY .00002 .300 .020
CIVJOB -.22352 -.844 -.131
RETIRE 1.30538* 1.747 .235
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
158 valid observations
source: derived from data in the
and Enlisted Personnel
1985 DoD Survey of Officer
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TABLE 15
LOGIT EQUATION FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -3.38172 1.120
personal: "
SEX -.03942 -.030 -.001#
BLACK 5.90286 .301 ,015#
HISP 6.80750 .167 .015#
OTHER -2.30322 -.967 -.116#
EDUC 1.27598 - .918 .009#
TOTDEP .25088 .668 .051
ocs 4.85022 .258 .013#
ROTC .78556 .794 .008#
DIRECT -.38680 -.250 -.006#-
MED -3.53266* -1.789 -.313#
LOS .05792** 2.462 .5 86
intrinsic:
PROM .49634** 2.377 .450
EXPECT .25078 .356 .057
DETAIL -.03844 -.071 -.008
JOB -.89332 -1.346 -.230
FAMILY -.19312 -.363 -.065
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00002 -.102 -.056
SUPPAY .00002 .231 .022
CIVJOB -.06628 -.214 -.059
RETIRE -.18444 -.403 -.045
* significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p - .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
140 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept .43536 9.792
personal: -
SEX -.73896** -2.435 -.064#
BLACK .81854 1.336 .0411
HISP -.49732 -.834 -.043*
OTHER -.55720 -.854 -.050#
EDUC -..06148 -.191 -.004#
TOTDEP .00562 .069 .001
OCS -.30860 -1.234 -.023$
ROTC -.19258 -.670 -.014#
DIRECT 7.85400 .177 ,070#
MED .00000
- LOS .03126*** 5.480 .427
intrinsic:
PROM .20062*** 3.933 .237
EXPECT -.41832*** -3.193 -.129
DETAIL -.34566*** -3.577 -.104
JOB -.10968 -.800 -.041
FAMILY -.17878 -1.441 -.076
extrinsic:
TOTPAY .00004 1.304 .157
SUPPAY .00000 -.321 .000
CIVJOB -.05058 -.812 -.062
RETIRE -.21872* -1.770 -.076
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
926 valid observations
source: derived from data in the
and Enlisted Personnel
1985 DoD Survey of Officer
54
TABLE 17
LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept .13764 4.434
personal: -
SEX -1.92988* -1.808 -.204S
BLACK 9.76622 .138 .049*
HISP -.85228 -.958 -.059#
OTHER -.40398 -.393 -.023#
EDUC -.15858 -.198 -.008#
TOTDEP -.06220 -.412 -.017
ocs -.87166* -1.917 -.042#
ROTC -.77358 -1.593 -.035#
DIRECT .00000
MED .00000
LOS .06266*** 4.184 .874
intrinsic:
PROM .16136* 1.710 .197
EXPECT -.29452 -1.237 -.096
DETAIL -.29718* -1.722 -.092
JOB -.22754 -.901 -.092
FAMILY -.18560 -.905 -.084
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00002 -.476 -.086
SUPPAY .00004 1.474 .037
CIVJOB -.09248 -.749 -.117
RETIRE -.05998 -.268 -.022
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
335 valid observations




LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept -.00352 1.770
personal: •
SEX .25184 .272 .018*
BLACK .73300 .595 .044#
HISP 5.82928 .058 .087#
OTHER -1.13570 -.414 -.143#
EDUC .95324 1.082 ,057#
TOTDEP -.10548 -.494 -.025
OCS -.50236 -.682 -.038#
ROTC .71728 .546 ,032#
DIRECT .59698 .004 .028#
MED .00000
LOS .05390** 2.376 .836
intrinsic:
PROM .19332 .972 .255
EXPECT -.88242 -1.485 -.284
DETAIL -.13662 -.383 -.047
JOB .00522 .012 .002
FAMILY .33064 .799 .147
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00012 -.583 -.497
SUPPAY -.00004** -2.198 -.098
CIVJOB .08416 .502 .112
RETIRE -.15748 -.417 -.060
* = significant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variable)
117 valid observations





LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Marines a career)
variable coefficient t ratio elasticity
intercept 4.10736 3.809
personal:
SEX -1.23494 -1.152 -,0 83#
BLACK 7.89462 .303 .064#
HISP -.94714 -.559 -,086#
OTHER .00000
EDUC -1.52796 -1.373 -.120#
TOTDEP .19990 .800 .047
OCS -.24802 -.289 -.008#
ROTC -1.30008 -1.607 -,075#
DIRECT .0000-0
MED .00000
LOS .05622** 2.366 .670
intrinsic:
PROM .29856** 1.964 .312
EXPECT -.45070 -1.165 -.121
DETAIL -.39428 -1.430 -.109
JOB -.69182 -1.632 -.238
FAMILY -.36848 -.834 -.137
extrinsic:
TOTPAY -.00012 -.970 -.426
SUPPAY .00002 .677 .024
CIVJOB -.00938 -.057 -.010
RETIRE -.35986 -.999 -.108
* = signif icant at p = .10
** = significant at p = .05
*** = significant at p = .01
# = effect on P (dummy variabl e)
162 valid iobservations
source: derived from data in the
and Enlisted Personnel
1985 DoD Survey of Officer
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TABLE 20
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 42 I 87 I 129







careerist I 26 I 1006 I 1032
I 2.2% I 86.6% I
I I I
total 68 1093 1161
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 21
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY
MODEL 1







I 98 I 31 I
I 8.4% I 2.7% I
I 216 I 816 I










PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 10 I 13 I 23
I 3.4% I 4.5% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 14 I 255 I 269
I 4.8% I 87.3% I
I I_ 1
total 24 268 292
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 23
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 19 I 4 I 23
I 6.5% I 1.4% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 65 I 204 I 269
I 22.3% I 69.9% I
I I I
total 84 208 292




PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 1
(cutoff P = .5)
predicted
actual
non--careen St careerist total
I I I
careerist I 22 I 25 I 47
I 11.5% I 13.1% I
I I I
I I I
careerist I 5 I 139 I 144
I 2.6% I 72.8% I
I I I
total 27 164 191
source: derived from data in the 1935 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 25
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 1







I 37 ][ 10 I
I 19.4% ][ 5.2% I
I
I
I 34 ][ 110 I











PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1
(cutoff P = .5)
predicted
actual
non-careeri St careerist total
I I I
careerist I 3 I 9 I 12
I 1.9% I 5.7% I
I I I
II I
careerist I 1 I 145 I 146
I 0.6% I 91.8% I
I I I
total 154 158
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 27
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1

































total 41 117 158







PREDICTION TABLE. FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1







I 9 I 6 I
I 6.4% I 4.3% I
I I
I I
I 2 I 123 I







source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 29
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1





I 13 I 2 I
I 9.3% I 1.4% I
I 19 I 106 I










PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 21 I 115 I 136
I 2.3% I 12.4% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist 16 1 784 I 790
I 0.6% I 84.7% I
I I I
total 27 899 926
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 31
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 96 I 40 I 136
I 10.4% I 4.3% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 210 I 580 I 790
I 22.7% I 62.6% I
I I I
total 306 620 926




PREDICTION TA3LE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1







I 11 I 40 I
I 3.3% I 11.9% I
I I
I I
I 1 I 283 I







source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 33
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 1







I 41 ]C 10 I
I 12.2% ][ 3.0% I
I
I
I 63 ][ 221 I











PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 4 I 15 I 19
I 3.4% I 12.8% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 1 I 97 I , 98
I 0.9% I 82.9% I
I __I I
total 5 .112 117
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 35
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 1




non-careerist I 14 I 5 I 19
I 12.0% I 4.3% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 27 I 71 I 98
I 23.1% I 60.7% I
I I I
total 41 76 117




PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1






I 7 I 14 I
I 4.3% I 8.6% I
I 3 I 13 8 I






source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 37
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 1
























PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 42 I 87 I 129
I 3.6% I 7.5% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 23 I 1009 I 1032
I 2.0% I 86.9% I
I I 1
total 65 1096 1161
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 39
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL ARMY
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 101 I 28 I 129
I 8.7% I 2.4% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 243 I 789 I 1032
I 20.9% I 68.0% I
I I I
total 344 817 1161




PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2
(cutoff P = .5)
predicted
non--careerist careens t total
I I I
non-careerist I 8 I 15 I 23







careerist I 8 I 261 I 269
I 2.7% I 89.4% I
I X X
total 16 276 292
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 41
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2






I 18 I 5 I
I 6.2% I 1.7% I
I 68 I 201 I










PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 26 I 21 I 47
I 13.6% I 11.0% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 13 I 131 I 144
I 6.8% I 63.6% I
I I I
total 39 152 191
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 43
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY MEDICAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 37 I 10 I 47
I 19.4% I 5.2% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 36 I 108 I 144
I 18.8% I 56.5% I
I I I
total 73 118 191




PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2




non-careerist i 3 I 9 I 12







careerist i 2 I 144 I 145
i 1.3% I 91.1% I
- I I I
-
total 5 153 158
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 45
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2







I 10 I 2 I
I 6.3% I 1.3% I
I I_ I
I I
I 31 I 115 I











PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 9 I 6 I 15
I 6.4% I 4.3% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist 15 1 120 I 125
I 3.6% I 85.7% I
I I I
total 14 126 140
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 47
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 13 I 2 I 15
I 9.3% I 1.4% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 29 I 96 I 125
I 20.7% I 68.6% I
I I I
total 42 98 140




PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 2





careerist I 23 I 113 I 136




careerist I 7 I 7 83 I 790
I 0.8% I 84.6% I
I _I_ I
total 30 896 926
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 49
PREDICTION TABLE FOR ALL MARINE CORPS
MODEL 2


























PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 10 I 41 I 51
I 3.0% I 12.2% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I I 284 I 284
I 0.0% I 84.8% I
I I L
total 10 325 335
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TA3LE 51
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 39 I 12 I 51
I 11.6% I 3.6% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 66 I 218 I 284
I 19.7% I 65.1% I
I I I
total 105 230 335




PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 3 I 16 I 19







careerist I 3 I 95 I 98
I 2.6% I 81.2% I
I I I
total 6 111 117
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 53
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
MODEL 2








I 15 I 4 I
I 12.8% I 3.4% I
I I
I I
I 20 I 78 I











PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 8 I 13 I 21
I 4.9% I 8.0% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist 13 1 138 I 141
I 1.9% I 85.2% I
I I I
total 11 151 16-2
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 55
PREDICTION TABLE FOR MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL
MODEL 2




non-careerist I 15 I 6 I 21
I 9.3% I 3.7% I
actual I I I
I I
careerist I 30 I 111 I 141
I 18.5% I 68.5% I
I I L
total 45 117 162




SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES
MODEL 1
proportion of correct predictions
(cutoff P = .5)


















89.5 97.9 - 33.3
source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
TABLE 57
SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TA3LES
MODEL 1
proportion of correct predictions
(cutoff P = mean value)
group overall careerists non-careerists
all Army 78.7% 79.1% 76.0%
Army tactical operations 76.4 75.8 82.6
Army medical 77.0 76.4 78.7
Army administrative 30.4 79.4 91.7
Army non-occupational 85.0 84.8 86.7
all Marine Corps 73.0 73.4 70.6
Marines tactical ops 78.2 77.8 80.4
Marines administrative 72.7 72.4 73.7
Marines non-occupational 79.7 80.1 76.2




SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES
MODEL 2
proportion of correct predictions
(cutoff P = .5)
group overall careerists non-careerists




















SUMMARY OF PREDICTION TABLES
MODEL 2
proportion of correct predictions
(cutoff P = mean value)























RESULTS OF CHOW TEST
E value
comparison groups Model 1 Model 2
all Army with
all Marine Corps
Army with Marine Corps
tactical operations
Army with Marine Corps
administrative














Marine Corps: tactical ops
with administrative














Marine Corps: administrative 0.487
with non-occupational
* = significant at p = .05














source: derived from data in the 1985 DoD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel
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IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
By comparing Tables 2 through 10, the first conclusion
that can be drawn from these results is that intrinsic
factors appear to contribute more to career intentions than
extrinsic factors. In every group except "Marine Corps
administrative," there are more significant intrinsic than
extrinsic variables, and the relative level of significance
of intrinsic factors is higher. In the Marine Corps
administrative group, ~ neither intrinsic nor extrinsic
variables show any significance. This may be due to the
small sample size involved: this group had the smallest
number of valid observations (N = 117) of any group included
in the study.
Looking at specific variables, the only factors which
are not significant for any group are HISP, OTHER, EDUC,
DIRECT, and CIVJOB. This means that Hispanics and other
races are neither more nor less likely than whites to be
careerists. Education also does not significantly affect an
individual's career intentions. Officers receiving a direct
commission are just as likely to be careerists as academy
graduates. At the same time, in a couple of instances, OCS
commissioned officers are less likely to be careerists than
academy graduates (all Marine Corps and Marine Corps
tactical operations) , but ROTC commissioned officers (Army
tactical operations) seem to be more likely than academy
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graduates to be careerists. It is suspected that, since
most individuals in the study are past their initial
obligations, the commissioning source will have less of an
impact on career intentions than it would for individuals
within the first four years of service.
Perhaps surprisingly, the probability of finding a good
civilian job does not influence the career decision. This
indicates that officers in the Army and Marine Corps, as a
whole, do not seriously consider the possibility of
changing to a civilian career. These individuals are either
satisfied with a military career or choose to leave for
reasons other than just to get a better job. While the
benefits of leaving the service in order to make more money
in the outside world is a common topic of discussion among
military officers, apparently it is an option which, in
fact, does not significantly influence the career decision,
or, at least, not that of individuals who have already
served a number of years.
On the other hand, two factors, LOS and PROM, are
consistently significant. Clearly, the more senior an
individual is in terms of length of service and the greater
his probability of promotion, the more likely he is to make
the service a career. DETAIL and SEX also show up more
often than the other factors. This indicates that the more
satisfied an individual is with his current job the more
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likely he is to be career motivated. Women, however,
appear, overall, to be less career motivated than men.
The remaining factors show up as being significant only
once or twice. Most of the results are reasonable in light
of the literature review. Older individuals tend to be more
career motivated (in Army non-occupational and Marine Corps
tactical operations) ; this would be expected as age is
highly correlated with length of service (see Appendix C) .
Satisfaction with job- related factors (all Army and Marine
Corps non-occupational) , family-related factors (all Army
and Army medical), and retirement benefits (all Marine
Corps) all contribute to an increase in career intentions in
their respective groups. Individuals who are commissioned
through a medical program are less likely to be careerists
than academy graduates (all Army) ; this implies that doctors
are less likely to be careerists than other officers, and
this appears to be the case (see Appendix D) ; however, this
topic should be studied in greater detail before any
specific conclusions are made. Finally, Marine Corps
officers whose expectations of military life are met tend to
be more career motivated, as would be expected.
There are a few variables which stand out and warrant a
closer investigation. The most obvious is TOTPAY for all
Army. According to these results, if total military pay is
increased by ten percent then the probability of an
individual being a careerist will decrease by 1.2 percent.
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Even though this result is in keeping with Mullens'
conclusion, it is not one that follows common sense.
Although TOTPAY is highly correlated with LOS,
multicollinearity is not suspected to be the problem since
TOTPAY is negatively correlated with career intentions (see
Appendix C) . There is no apparent reason why this negative
relationship exists, but if this is truly the case, then
retention could be improved by decreasing pay, and that,
obviously, should not work. (An interesting possible study
could be one which investigates the reason for the negative
correlation between military pay and career intentions.)
According to the results, individuals who are in Marine
Corps tactical operations are more likely to be careerists
if they are married but less likely if they have dependents.
The most likely reason for this discrepancy is
multicollinearity between DEPEND and MARRIED. These two
factors are highly correlated (see Appendix C) , and this may
cause DEPEND to be unstable. This assumption is verified by
running the regression without MARRIED. As expected, this
causes DEPEND to become positive (see Appendix E)
.
Lastly, blacks in Army administrative occupations are
less likely to be careerists than whites. Since this is the
only group in the study in which race is significant, this
may indicate possible discrimination problems within this
one specialty in the Army. However, a more likely
explanation is simply that most of the 25 blacks (see
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Appendix D) who are included in the -study have- decided
against a military career for reasons independent of their
race (BLACK is just barely significant at p = .10) .
Model 2 was estimated in an attempt to clear up these
problems and develop a better model; however, the results of
Model 2 are comparable to those of Model 1. The influence
of intrinsic factors still dominate over that of extrinsic
factors. Likewise, the specific factors that were found to
be significant, and their corresponding elasticities, change
very little between Models 1 and 2. Nonetheless, there are
a couple of differences worth noting.
Although MARRIED and DEPEND are both significant for
Marine Corps tactical operations, TOTDEP is not; nor is it
significant to any other group in the study. In the
literature review, it was noted that Stolzenberg and Winkler
found single individuals without dependents to be more
career oriented whereas Warner and Goldberg found the
opposite to be the case. The situation may be that some
individuals feel they should stay in the military for their
family's sake (job security and the like), whereas others
feel they should get out in order to improve their family
life (avoid long separations and so forth). Based on this
study, no determination can be made concerning the impact of
dependents on the career decision. Apparently, overall, it
has no (or, perhaps, unpredictable would be more accurate)
influence on the career decision.
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SUPPAY is found to be significant to only one group:
Marine Corps administrative. This indicates that the
individuals in this group who are receiving a relatively
greater income from sources outside the military are less
likely to stay in, which makes sense. Nevertheless, the
lack of significance of SUPPAY to all other groups supports
the conclusion that extrinsic factors are relatively
unimportant to the career decision. As with the probability
of finding a good civilian job, most officers are not highly
influenced by outside income: they serve in the military
because they like it (intrinsic factors)
.
Since the services can do little to change an
individual's personal characteristics, any policy changes
aimed at improving retention must concentrate on either
intrinsic or extrinsic factors. A closer look at the
elasticities in Tables 2 through 19 reveals that most of the
elasticities of these factors are quite small. In some
cases, PROM exceeds .6, but most of the statistically
significant elasticities of the factor are around the .1 to
.2 range. This means that a ten percent increase in that
factor will result in only a one to two percent increase in
retention. Therefore, any policy changes should include a
combination of factors if it is to have a significant
impact. In addition to the additive effect, this would
allow the policymakers to take advantage of any interactions
between factors or multiplicative effects of one factor's
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elasticity on that of another (e.g., if two factors each
improve retention by 2%, then the net improvement from
incorporating both factors will be 2% + 2% + (2% x 2%)).
The results of the Chow test (Table 60) indicate that
there are three general groups included in this study: all
Marine Corps, all Army (excluding medical specialists) , and
Army medical specialists. The results show a statistically
significant difference between all Army and all Marine Corps
and between Army and Marine Corps tactical operations.
While the difference between Army and Marine Corps
administrative and Army and Marine Corps non-occupational is
not significant, this suggests only that the null hypothesis
(i.e., that the two groups are not significantly different)
cannot be rejected. It is suspected that if larger sample
sizes were available, then a difference would manifest
itself. Likewise, Army medical is significantly different
from Army tactical operations and from administrative but
not from non-occupational. At the same time, Army non-
occupational is the smallest Army group (N = 140) , and it is
suspected that a larger sample would show a difference
between these groups.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis attempts to locate and describe factors
which are important contributors to the career decision of
Army and Marine Corps officers. In addition, the thesis
examines whether Army and Marine Corps officers, both as a
whole and as members of specific specialties, would be
similarly affected by certain policy changes. This was done
in order to guide potential policymakers in determining what
factors would have the greatest impact on officer retention.
In order to conduct this study, data were taken from the
1985 DoD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. Army and
Marine Corps officers between their fourth-year and twelfth-
year of service were looked at both as members of their
specific DoD specialties and as members of their respective
branch of service. Individuals were classified as either
"careerists" or "non-careerists" based on their intended
total length of service (persons with 20 or more years were
considered careerists and those with 19 or less years were
defined as non-careerists). A LOGIT regression was
estimated for each group using career intentions as the
dependent variable based on a collection of independent
variables which previous studies have determined to
influence the career decision. These variables were
classified as one of three general types: personal,
intrinsic, or extrinsic factors. The results of these
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regressions were used to estimate the elasticities of
significant factors. The predictive validity of these
models was also estimated. Finally, the individual models
were compared to determine whether the respective groups are
significantly different or could be considered,
functionally, as a single group.
In attempting to use these models to predict career
intentions, which is incidental to the primary purpose of
this study, it cannot be assumed that an individual will be
a careerist if his predicted probability of being a
careerist (P) is simply greater than .5. Although using .5
as the cutoff point gives a high overall proportion of
correct predictions, potential non-careerists are more
accurately identified by using the mean value of the
predicted probabilities as the cutoff point. Otherwise, it
would be easier to just assume that everyone is a potential
careerist.
The basic conclusions of this study can be summarized as
follows. For the groups examined, intrinsic factors
apparently contributed more to the career decision than did
extrinsic factors. It should follow, then, that increased
retention, may be achieved by improving intrinsic factors or
rewards in the military, particularly the individual's
promotion probability and placement in a satisfying job.
Extrinsic factors still exercise a strong influence on the
officer's career decision, but the available evidence
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suggests that intrinsic elements of service are relatively
more important. Personal factors also contribute to career
intentions, specifically length of service and sex; however,
the services, obviously, have little control over these
factors other than to limit the number of billets available
to specific groups (discriminate), such as women. Most
factors alone do not contribute much to retention (average
elasticity is around .2) , so an effective retention program
must include a combination of factors. Lastly, although
similar factors motivate all officers to be careerists, the
three groups studied here—Army as a whole, Marine Corps as
a whole, and Army medical specialists—cannot be viewed as a
single group. Each group has a certain unique character and
must be considered separately when determining policy
changes intended to increase retention.
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APPENDIX A
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES
AGE : question ID 036E35
"How old were you on your last birthday?"
Variable used as given.
SEX : 035E34
"Are you male or female?"
Variable was recoded: male = 0, female = 1.
RACJI: RACE4
A composite variable created by the surveyists based on
two questions related to descent:














Yes, Central or South American
Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic"
black includes "black" on question one and "no" or
blank on question two;
Hispanic includes any "yes" on question two;
other includes "American Indian," "Oriental," or
89
"other" on question one, or question one not
answered and question two answered "no;"
white includes "white" on question one and "no" or
blank on question two;
missing if neither question is answered.
Variable was recoded into three dummy variables:
white = 0, BLACK = 1;
white = 0, HISP = If
white 0, OTHER = 1.
EDUC (education) : 046
"As of today, what is the highest degree or diploma
that you hold? Do not include degrees from technical,
trade, or vocational schools. Mark one.









Other Degree not listed above."
Variable was recoded: bachelor's degree = 0, master's or
doctoral degree = 1, all others = missing.
tlAERXED.: 051E48
"Are you currently:







Variable was recoded: single = (includes single,
widowed, and divorced), married = 1 (includes
married for first time, remarried, and separated)
.
DEPEND (dependents) : 067E64
"How many dependents do you have? Do not include
yourself or your spouse."
Variable was recoded: none 0, one dependant = 1, two :
2, etc.
TOTDEP (total number of dependents) : 051E48 + 067E64
This variable was constructed by adding one to the
number of dependents if the individual is married.
COM3 (commissioning source) : O10
"Through which of the following officer procurement
programs did you obtain your commission/warrant?
Academy Graduate
Limited Duty Officer Program
Officer Candidate School or Officer Training School
ROTC (Regular)
ROTC (Scholarship)
Aviation Officer Candidate or Aviation Cadet
Warrant Officer Program
Direct Appointment from Civilian Status
Reserve Officer Candidate
Platoon Leaders Course/WOC
Health Professional Scholarship Program
Medical Specialist Program
Other"
Variable was recoded into four dummy variables:
academy = 0, OCS = 1 (includes OCS/OTS and AOCS)
,




academy = 0, DIRECT = 1 (includes direct appointment
_ from civilian status)
,
academy = 0, MED = 1 (includes health professional
scholarship program and medical specialist
program)
.
LOS (length of service) : 06E6
"To the nearest year and month, how long have you been
on active duty? If you had a break in service, count
current time and time in previous tour(s), and count
prior enlisted time."
Variable used as given (total months)
.
PROM (promotion probability) : 032
"What do you think your chances are of being promoted to
the next higher pay grade? Mark one.
Does not apply, I plan to retire
Does not apply, I plan to leave the Service





















(10 in 10) Certain"
Variable was recoded: no chance or do not expect any
more promotions = 0, very slight possibility = 1,
etc, certain = 10, I plan to retire or I plan to
leave the Service = missing.
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EXPECT (military life as expected) : O108104A
"How much do you agree or disagree with each of the
following statements about military life? Life in the
military is about what I expected it to be."
Strongly Agree = 1
Agree = 2
Neither Agree Nor Disagree = 3
Disagree = 4
Strongly Disagree = 5
Variable was recoded: question not answered = missing.
DETAIL (satisfaction with current job) : O109105J
"Below is a list of issues particular to a military way
of life. Considering current policies, please indicate
your level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with each
issue: Satisfaction with current job."
Very satisfied = 1
Satisfied = 2
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied = 3
Dissatisfied = 4
Very dissatisfied = 5
Variable was recoded: question not answered = missing.
JOB/FAMILY
These two variables were constructed using factor
analysis. The following variables and their
corresponding weights are included in these factors:
O109105A: Satisfaction with personal freedom
O109105F: Satisfaction with environment for family
O109105G: Satisfaction with frequency of moves
O109105I: Satisfaction with opportunity to serve
country
O109105M: Satisfaction with job security
O109105N: Satisfaction with working environment
O109105L: Satisfaction with job training/in service
education
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The two factors were constructed by adding the products
of each variable with its corresponding weight.
TOTPAY (total military pay) : WAGES + BAS + BAQ + VHA
This variable was computed from the values found by the
surveyists in the 8503 JUMPS file and was computed as
the sum of taxable military income, basic allowance for
subsistence, basic allowance for quarters, and variable
housing allowance.
Variables were used as given.
SUPPAY (supplemental pay) : INCOME2 - (WAGES + BAS + 3AQ +
VHA)
This variable was constructed by subtracting total
military pay from total family income.
CIVJOS (probability of finding a good civilian job) : 096E92
"If you were to leave the Service now and tried to find
a civilian job, how likely would you be to find a good
civilian job? Mark one.
(0 in 10) No Chance
(1 in 10) Very slight possibility
(2 in 10) Slight possibility
(3 in 10) Some possibility
(4 in 10) Fair possibility
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(5 in 10) Fairly good possibility
-
(6 in 10) Good possibility
(7 in 10) Probable
(8 in 10) Very probable
(9 in 10) Almost sure
(10 in 10) Certain"
Variable v/as recoded: no chance = 0, very slight
possibility = 1, etc., certain = 10, don't know or
question not answered = missing,
RETIRE (satisfaction with retirement benefits) : O109105H




MEAN VALUES OF VARIABLES
ALL ARMY ARMY FACTICAL OPEIRATIONS
MEAN STD DEV MEAN STD DEV
CAREER .889 .314 CAREER .921 .270
AGE 31.370 3.839 AGE 30.092 2.764
SEX .286 .452 SEX .062 .241
BLACK .109 .312 BLACK .099 .300
HISP .034 .182 HISP .045 .207
OTHER .035 .185 OTHER .031 .173
EDUC .351 .478 EDUC .137 .344
MARRIED .767 .423 MARRIED .784 .412
DEPEND 1.146 1.256 DEPEND 1.223 1.236
TOTDEP 1.912 1.475 TOTDEP 2.007 1.460
OCS .068 .252 OCS .072 .259
ROTC .549 .498 ROTC .682 .467
DIRECT .161 .368 DIRECT .021 .142
MED .056 .230 MED .000 .000
LOS 95.861 27.085 LOS 92.942 26.011
PROM 8.202 2.020 PROM 8.524 1.671
EXPECT 2.183 .862 EXPECT 2.185 .862
DETAIL
.
2.228 1.106 DETAIL 2.182 1.121
JOB 2.654 .902 JOB 2.533 .870
FAMILY 2.947 .949 FAMILY 2.979 .988
TOTPAY 26972.225 5949.360 TOTPAY 25581.932 2867.500
SUPPAY 11163.551 14955.120 SUPPAY 7299.736 10367.856
CIVJOB 8.066 1.924 CIVJOB 7.795 1.970
























































































































DEPEND ' 1.086 1.135
















ALL MARINE CORPS MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MEAN STD DEV MEAN STD DEV
CAREER .853 .354 CAREER .848 .360
AGE 29.874 2.957 AGE 29.731 2.728
SEX .173 .378 SEX .024 .153
BLACK .042 .201 BLACK .006 .077
HISP .030 .171 HISP .039 .193
OTHER .015 .122 OTHER .021 .143
EDUC .163 .37 EDUC .093 .290
MARRIED .724 .447 MARRIED .764 .425
DEPEND .976 1.122 DEPEND 1.051 1.119
TOTDEP 1.700 1.394 " TOTDEP 1.815 1.380
OCS .306 .461 OCS .299 .458
ROTC .171 .376 ROTC .191 .394
DIRECT .005 .073 DIRECT .000 .000
MED .000 .000 MED .000 .000
LOS 93.100 26.288 LOS 91.639 26.261
PROM 8.054 2.061 PROM 8.006 2.111
EXPECT 2.092 .822 EXPECT 2.134 .884
DETAIL ' 2.054 1.089 DETAIL 2.027 1.082
JOB 2.559 .894 JOB 2.651 .910
FAMILY 2.909 .915 FAMILY 2.971 .964
TOTPAY 26694.614 5683.675 TOTPAY 28320.546 5945.999
SUPPAY 8355.661 12413.734 SUPPAY 6101.783 10031.246
CIVJOB 8.325 1.740 CIVJOB 8.322 1.826

























































CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .0398 -.1523** -.0078 -.0234
AGE .0398 1.0000 .0250 -.0690* -.0010
SEX -.1523** .0250 1.0000 .0591 -.0255
BLACK -.0078 -.0690* .0591 1.0000 -.0662
HISP -.0234 -.0010 -.0255 -.0662 1.0000
OTHER -.0511 .0485 .0235 -.0671 -.0361
EDUC -.0440 .4331** .0093 -.0614 -.0302
MARRIED .0576 .0441 -.2546** -.0154 .0038
DEPEND .0519 .2919** -.2328** .0077 .0383
TOTDEP .0607 .2612** -.2713** .0022 .0337
OCS .0520 .0243 -.0045 .0368 .0240
ROTC .1089** -.2871** -.2302** .0572 .0290
DIRECT -.0688* .3737** .4435** .0116 -.0185
MED -.2119** .0888* .0698* -.0133 -.0255
LOS .2344** .5026** -.1588** -.0322 -.0470
PROM .2526** -.2009** -.1210** -.0365 .0395
EXPECT -.1283** -.0791* .0887* .0407 -.0019
DETAIL -.1973** -.0018 .1004** .0749* -.0305
JOB - -.2269** -.0092 .1434** .0966** -.0031
FAMILY -.1140** -.0657 -.0790* -.0679 -.0597
TOTPAY -.0996** .5570** -.0514 -.0512 .0244
SUPPAY -.0548 .0586 .3619** -.0353 -.0113
CIVJOB -.0576 .0095 .0030 -.0408 -.0360
RETIRE -.1188** -.0629 .0939** .1033** .0297
OTHER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
-.0511 -.0440 .0576 .0519 .0607 .0520
.0435 .4331** .0441 .2919** .2612** .0248
.0235 .0093 -.2546** -.2328** -.2713** -.0045
-.0671 -.0614 -.0154 .0077 .0022 .0368
-.0361 -.0302 .0033 .0383 .0337 .0240
1.0000 .0351 -.0153 .0336 .0241 -.0146
.0351 1.0000 .1076** .1546** .1626** -.0914**
-.0158 .1076** 1.0000 .3932** .6218** .0273
.0336 .1546** .3932** 1.0000 .9646** .0150
.0241 .1626** .6218** .9646** 1.0000 .0207
-.0146 -.0914** .0278 .0150 .0207 1.0000
-.0328 -.2388** .0274 -.0093 .0000 -.2979**
.0304 .2173** -.1127** -.0153 -.0454 -.1184**
-.0060 .2210** .0458 .0673 .0704* -.0658
-.0030 .2225** .1305** .1889** .1983** .0326
-.0146 -.0130 .0422 .0217 .0306 .0474
,^...0080 -.0458 -.0527 -.0127 -.0260 -.0456
*' \0196 -.0084 -.0389 -.0481 -.0522 .0185
.0342 -.0192 -.0417 -.0713* -.0727* -.0056
.0134 .0060 .0013 .0352 .0304 .0326
.0483 .4254** .0874* .2501** .2381** -.0976**
-.0280 .0613 .2825** -.1045** -.0079 .0138
.0128 .1650** .0031 .0445 .0388 -.0591
.0017 -.0421 -.0649 -.0300 -.0442 -.0165




ROTC • DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER .1039** -.0688* -.2119** .2544** .2526**
AGE -.2871** .3737** .0883* .5026** -.2009**
SEX -.2802** .4435** .0698* -.1583** -.1210**
BLACK .0572 .0116 -.0135 -.0522 -.0565
HISP .0290 -.0185 -.0255 -.0470 .0595
OTHER -.0328 .0504 -.0060 -.0050 -.0146
EDUC -.2588** .2173** .2210** .2225** -.0150
MARRIED .0274 -.1127** .0458 .1505** .0422
DEPEND -.0093 -.0153 .0675 .1839** .0217
TOTDEP .0000 ~.0454 .0704* .1985** .0506
OCS -.2979** -.1184** -.0658 .0526 .0474
ROTC 1 .0000 -.4831** -.2685** -.0524 .0506
DIRECT -.4831** 1.0000 -.1067** -.0529 -.1727**
MED -.2685** -.1067** 1.0000 -.0158 -.0411
LOS -.0324 -.0329 -.0158 1.0000 -.0869*
PROM .0506 -.1727** -.0411 -.0869* 1.0000
EXPECT .0625 -.0172 .0551 -.0925** -.1416**
DETAIL
„
.0041 .0409 .0650 -.0012 -.1580**
JOB' -.0364 .0977** .1067** -.0655 -.2851**
FAMILY .0126 -.0977** .0155 -.0155 -.0247
TOTPAY -.2129** .1577** .5552** .2546** -.1525**
SUPPAY -.1446** .1773** .0646 -.0185 -.0556
CIVJOB -.1190** .0259 .1416** -.0617 .1941**"
RETIRE .0186 -.0113 .0180 -.0855* -.0177
EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY
1285** -.1975** -.2269** -.1140** -.0996** -.0548
0791* -.0018 -.0092 -.0657 .5570** .0586
0887* .1004** .1454** -.0790* -.0514 .5619XX
0407 .0749* .0966** -.0679 -.0512 -.0555
0019 -.0505 -.0081 -.0597 .0244 -.0115
0080 .0196 .0542 .0154 .0485 -.0280
0458 -.0084 -.0192 .0060 .4254** .0615
0527 -.0589 -.0417 .0015 .0874* .2825XX
0127 -.0481 -.0715* .0352 .2501** -.1045XX
0260 -.0522 -.0727* .0304 .2581** -.0079
0456 .0185 -.0056 .0326 -.0976XX .0158
0625 .0041 -.0564 .0126 -.2129XX -.1446XX
0172 .0409 .0977** -.0977** .1577XX .1775XX
0551 .0650 .1067** .0135 .5552XX .0646
0925** -.0012 -.0655 -.0153 .2546XX -.0185
1416** -.1580** -.2351** -.0247 -.1525XX -.0556
0000 .2825** .5655** .2963** -.0208 .0511
2825** 1.0000 .4969** .1575** -.0271 .0509
5655** .4969** 1 .0000 .0418 .0142 .0604
2968** .1575** .0418 1 .0000 .0147 -.0204
0208 -.0271 .0142 .0147 1 .0000 .0108
0511 .0509 .0604 -.0204 .0108 1 .0000
0039 -.0602 -.0475 .0614
.
1279XX .0270



























RETIRE . .0649 1.0000
X - SIGNIF. LE .01 XX - SIGN
(l-TAILED, " . " PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
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ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .0605 -.1894XX -.0304 .0015
AGE .0605 1.0000 -.0241 -.0402 .0770
SEX -.1894** -.0241 ' 1.0000 -.0375 .0137
BLACK -.0304 -.0402 -.0375 1.0000 -.0717
HISP .0015 .0770 .0137 -.0717 1.0000
OTHER -.0214 .0156 .0367 -.0592 -.0385
EDUC .0795 .3260** -.0193 .0342 -.0377
MARRIED .0939 .1292 -.1079 .0350 -.0482
DEPEND .0837
.
.2757** -.0578 -.0135 -.0120
TOTDEP .0973 .2699XX . -.0794 -.0016 -.0238
OCS -.0170 -.0093 .0389 .0848 -.0601




-.1369* .1526* .4647XX .0326 .0858
!0958 ^7981XX -!l365X -!0658 !0114
PROM .2061** -.1861XX -.0208 .0261 .1213
EXPECT -.1736* -.0390 .0111 -.0181 .0115
DETAU. -.2821** .0639 .0602 .0485 -.0350
JO"B -.2374XX -.0042 .0709 .0351 -.0288
FAMILY -.0873 -.0380 .0346 .0019 -.1524X
TOTPAY .1009 .6942XX -.0773 -.0782 -.0266
SUPPAY -.0481 .0615 .2493XX .0249 -.0582
CIVJOB .0147 -.0792 -.1180 -.0002 -.1378X


















































































































































ARMY TACTICAL OPERATIONS (CONT)
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER .1003 -.1369X .0958 .2061**
AGE .0709 .1526X .7931** -.1361**
SEX -.0693 .4647X* -.1365* -.0208
BLACK .0304 .0326 -.0658 .0261
HISP .1119 .0858 .0114 .1213
OTHER -.0907 -.0258 .0057 .0034
EDUC -.1125 .0327 .3361** .1137
MARRIED -.0548 -.0414 .1454* .0400
DEPEND .0280 . -..0261 .1891** .0398
TOTDEP .0033 -.0338 .2011** .0450
OCS -.4072** -.0403 -.0576 .0715
ROTC 1.0000 -.2119** .0412 -.1813**
DIRECT -.2119** 1.0000 .0152 .0413
MED 1 0000 _
LOS .0412 .0152 1.0000 -.1474*
PROM -.1818** .0413 -.1474* 1.0000
EXPECT .0872 -.0592 -.0708 -.2522**
DETAIL * .0255 .1060 -.0002 -".1647*
JOB * .0677 -.0196 -.0664 -.2879**
FAMILY -.0507 -.0035 -.0690 -.0320
TOTPAY .1550* -.0049 .6584** -.2194**
SUPPAY -.0640 .0960 .0452 -.0573
CIVJOB -.0864 -.0462 .0254 .2801**
RETIRE -.0573 .0493 -.1059 -.0244
XPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY
1736* -.2821** -.2374** -.0873 . .1009 -.0481
0390 .0639 -.0042 -.0380 .6942** .0615
0111 .0602 .0709 .0346 -.0773 .2493**
0181 .0485 .0351 .0019 -.0732 .0249
0115 -.0350 -.0288 -.1524* -.0266 -.0582
0844 .0419 -.0146 .0512 -.0635 -.0210
1083 -.0736 -.1270 .0025 .2919** .0454
0160 -.0712 -.0081 -.0171 .1271 .2412**
0162 -.0516 -.0747 -.0565 .2071** -.1194
0092 -.0638 -.0655 -.0527 .2112** -.0330
0290 .0496 .0646 .0244 -.1947** .0864
0872 .0255 .0677 -.0507 .1550* -.0640
0592 .1060 -.0196 -.0035 -.0049 .0960
0703 -!0002 -!o664 -!0690 !6584** !0452
2322** -.1647* -.2379** -.0320 -.2194** -.0573
0000 .3246** .4018** .3621** .0473 .0115
3246** 1.0000 .4830** .1778* -.0306 -.0219
4018** .4880** 1.0000 .1124 -.0602 .0920
3621** .1778* .1124 1.0000 -.0209 .0490
0473 -.0306 -.0602 -.0209 1.0000 .0987
0115 -.0219 .0920 .0490 .0987 1.0000
0063 -.0188 -.0383 .1243 -.0420 .0119
1983** .1304 .2750** .2837** -.0494 -.0761
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RETIRE - .0928 1.0000
x - SIGNIF. LE .01 XX - SIGNIF. LE .001
Cl-TAILED, » . » PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
10^
ARMY MEDICAL
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .0450 .1017 .0366 -.1711*
AGE .0450 1.0000 -.1616 .0120 .0400
SEX .1017 -.1616 1.0000 .0792 .0339
BLACK .0366 .0120 .0792 1.0000 -.0500
HISP -.1711* .0400 .0339 -.0500 1.0000
OTHER -.0869 .0650 .0734 -.0924 -.0395
EDUC -.1398 .3137** -.3929** -.1069
'
.1075
MARRIED -.0426 -.0686 -.2814** .0132 .0883
DEPEND -.0078 .4046** -.2775** .0397 .2432**
TOTDEP -.0180 .. _ .3367** -.3165** .0382 .2361**
OCS . , . # ,
RQTC .0312 -.1793* -.1856* -.0363 -.0427
DIRECT .1001 .2520** .2487** .1279 -.0038
MED -.2004* -.1058 -.2679** -.0287 -.0123
LOS .3813** .3376** .0201 -.0048 -.0160
PROM .1287 -.2040* -.1253 -.1257 -.0596
EXPECT -.0924 -.1391 .0120 .1347 .0035
DETAIL -.1769* -.1616 .1135 .0421 .0130
JQB - -.1715* -.2342** .1155 .1089 .0538
FAMILY -.1940* -.1020 -.1421 -.1464 .0444
TOTPAY -.1231 .5506** -.4819** -.0900 .1968*
SUPPAY -.0385 -.0748 .3185** -.0026 .1404
CIVJOB -.1126 .0611 -.0912 .1025 -.0257

























:DUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP C
1398 -.0426 -.0078
-.0180
3137** -.0686 .4046** .3367**
3929** -.2314** -.2775** -.3165**
1069 .0132 .0397 .0382
1075 .0883 .2432** .2361**
0680 -.0248 .1034 .0841
0000 .2507** .1814* .2244**
2507** 1.0000 .3594** .5756**
1814* .3594** 1.0000 .9700**





2252** .1747* .0679 .1051
0320 -.0699 .1383 .1030











5242** .1595 .4240** .4131**










ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER .0312 .1001 -.2004* 3813** .1287
AGE -.1793* .2520** -.1058 3376** -.2040*
SEX -.1856* .2487** -.2679** 0201 -.1253
BLACK -.0363 .1279 -.0237 - - 0048 -.1257
HISP -.0427 -.0038 -.0123 0160 . -.0596
OTHER -.0016 .0553 -.0300 0724 .0450
EDUC -.0709 -.1234 .2252** 0320 .1095
MARRIED .0002 -.1618 .1747* 0699 .1495
DEPEND -.0807 -.0014 .0679 1333 -.0195
TOTDEP -.0706 - -.0434 .1051 1030 .0220
OCS # # . .
ROTC 1.0000 -.2997** -.1857* 1013 .1561
DIRECT -.2997** 1.0000 -.6523** 1208 -.1347*
MED -.1857* -.6528** 1.0000 0714 .0470
LOS -.1013 -.1208 .0714 1 0000 -.1405
PROM .1561 -.1847* .0470 1405 1.0000
EXPECT -.0109 .0055 .0759 1346 -.0412
DETAIL -.0628 .0298 .0730 0342 -.0647
J03, * -.0266 .0242 .0658 1253 -.2475**
FAMILY .0503 -.1148 .1552 0662 .0910
TOTPAY -.0908 -.0912 .1816* 1395 -.0761
SUPPAY -.0550 -.0353 .0077 0121 .0476
CIVJ03 .0585 -.0684 .1115 0959 .1900*






































































































































































JOB - -.0435 .3240**
FAMILY .0222 .26 52**




* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001
Cl-TAILED, " . PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
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ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .1456 -.1329 -.1376 .0518
AGE .1456 1 .0000 -.0289 -.2372X .0224
SEX -.1329 -.0289 1.0000 .1077 -.0605
BLACK -.1376 -.2372* .1077 1.0000 -.0784
HISP .0518 .0224 -.0605 -.0784 1 .000
OTHER -.1812 .0216 .0328 -.0491 -.0205
EDUC .0731 .4198XX -.1167 -.0837 .0099
MARRIED -.0062 .0128 -.3370XX -.0203 .0245




.1571 -.3758XX .0284 .0322
OCS .1153 .1996X .0405 -.0241 .1362
ROTC -.0311 -.4352XX -.2705XX .1301 -.0052
DIRECT -.0989 .3064X* .5212XX -.0165 -.0708
MED . , , , %
LOS .0762 .6202X5* -.2440X -.1199 .0748
PROM .3203** -.0594 .0382 -.1354 .0822
EXPECT -.0842 -.0708 .0009 .0279 -.0267
DETAIL -.0107 .0579 .1074 .1422 -.0883
JOS -.0846 -.0937 .0629 .1248 -.0597
FAMILY -.0035 -.0240 -.1253 -.0312 -.0192
TOTPAY -.0127 .5480XX -.1005 -.1154 -.0132
SUPPAY -.0177 -.0529 .3746XX -.0904 -.0686
CIVJOB .0465 -.1610 -.0212 -.1781 .0416
RETIRE -.0426 -.0972 .1483 .1902X .1278-
THER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
1812 .0731 -.0062 .0630 .0497 .1153
0216 .4198XX .0128 .1868X .1571 .1996X
0328 -.1167 -.3370XX -.3317XX -.3758XX .0405
0491 -.0337 -.0203 .0422 .0234 -.0241
0205 .0099 .0245 .0300 .0322 .1362
0000 -.0874 .0670 -.0977 -.0594 -.0455
0874 1.0000 .0988 .2426X .2293X -.0837
0670 .0988 1 .0000 .4612XX .6862XX -.0121
0977 .2426X .4612XX 1 .0000 .9619XX -.0179
0594 .2293X .6862XX .9619XX 1.0000 -.0184
0455 -.0837 -.0121 -.0179 -.0184 1.0000
1428 -.1135 .1830 .1046 .1421 -.5072XX
1224 .1988X -.2361X -.1619 -.2055X -.1575
0469 .4222XX .1693 !2055X !2206X -!o6S3
0776 .0743 .0018 -.0206 -.0163 .0843
0167 -.0723 .0108 -.0295 -.0209 -.0787
0133 -.0421 -.0644 -.0762 -.0823 .0206
0762 -.1088 .0826 .0086 .0325 -.0099
0579 -.0212 -.0150 .0716 .0541 -.0660
0547 .3564XX .0323 .0799 .0755 -.2446XX
1004 -.1068 .2955XX -.1110 .0000 -.0549
0420 .1396 .1110 .0360 .0637 .0156
0464 -.0535 -.0314 -.0628 -.0612 -.0220
108
ARMY ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)
ROTC DIRECT J1ED LOS PROM
CAREER -.0311 -.0989 .0762 .3203**
AGE -.4352** .3064** .6202** -.0594
SEX -.2705** .5212** -.2440* .0382
BLACK .1301 -.0165 -.1199 -.1354
HISP -.0052 -.0708 .0748 .0822
OTHER -.1428 .1224 .0469 -.0776
EDUC -.1135 .1988* .4222** .0743
MARRIED .1830 -.2361* .1693 .0013
DEPEND . .1046 • -.1619 .2055* -.0206
TOTDEP .1421 '• "-.2055* .2206* -.0163
OCS -.5072** -.1575 -.0683 .0843
ROTC 1.0000 -.4937** -.2043* .0114
DIRECT -.4937** 1.0000 .1947* -.0655
MED _ 1 0000
LOS -.2043* .1947* 1.0000 -.1205
PROM .0114 -.0655 -.1205 1.0000
EXPECT .0894 -.0972 -.0534 -.2330*
DETAIL, -.0637 .0924 -.0214 -.2053*
JOB .0254 -.0090 -.0061 -.3579**
FAMILY -.0518 -.0470 .0177 -.1450
TOTPAY -.0820 .1751 .7042** -.2210*
SUPPAY -.0939 .2417* -.0819 .0192
CIVJOB .0792 -.0891 -.0884 .2499**
RETIRE .0638 -.0356 -.0251 -.1931*
XPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY. TOTPAY SUPPAY
0842 -.0107 -.0846 -.0035 -.0127 -.0177
0708 .0579 -.0937 -.0240 .5480** -.0529
0009 .1074 .0629 -.1253 -.1005 .3746**
0279 .1422 .1248 -.0312 -.1154 -.0904
0267 -.0883 -.0397 -.0192 -.0132 -.0686
0167 -.0133 .0762 .0579 .0547 .1004
0723 -.0421 -.1088 -.0212 .3564** -.1068
0108 -.0644 .0826 -.0150 .0323 .2955**
0295 -.0762 .0086 .0716 .0799 -.1110
0209 -.0823 .0325 .0541 .0755 .0000
0787 .0206 -.0099 -.0660 -.2446** -.0549
0894 -.0637 .0254 -.0518 -.0820 -.0939
0972 .0924 -.0090 -.0470 .1751 .2417*
0534 -!0214 -!0061 !0177 !7042*X -!0819
2330* -.2053* -.3579** -.1450 -.2210* .0192
0000 .3682** .4715** .3525** .0222 .1239
3682** 1.0000 .4293** .2067* -.0266 .0684
4715** .4293** 1.0000 .2171* -.0104 .1160
3525** .2067* .2171* 1.0000 -.0419 -.0235
0222 -.0266 -.0104 -.0419 1.0000 -.0707
1239 .0684 .1160 -.0235 -.0707 1.0000
0292 -.0935 -.0210 .0541 -.1259 .1408




























* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001
Cl-TAILED,
.
" PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
110
ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER l.'OOOO .2384* -.1079 .0961 .0733
AGE .2384* 1.0000 -.1262 -.0056 -.0266
SEX -.1079 -.1262 1.0000 .2004* -.1082
BLACK .0961 -.0056 .2004* 1.0000 -.0587
HISP .0733 -.0266 -.1032 -.0587 1.0000
OTHER . -.0792 .0237 • .0181 -.0476 -.0363
EDUC .0506 .3735** -.1021 -.0210 -.0757
MARRIED .0797 .2291* -.1759 -.0155 .0066
DEPEND .0467 .3237** -.2414* .0526 -.0784
TOTDEP .0626 .3411** -.2553* .0402 -.0648
OCS .0908 .2129* .0098 .1535 -.0555
ROTC .1096 -.1105 -.0411 .0239 -.0243
DIRECT -.0483 .1935 .2616** .0068 .0538
MED -.1822 .0164 .0916 -.0534 -.0407
LOS .2999** .6399** -.0656 .0703 -.0884
PROM .3678** .0419 -.2267* .0360 .1235
EXPECT -.0296 -.1396 .0479 .0237 .0097
DETAIL -.2018* -.0077 .1578 .1616 -.0130
JOB » -.3047** .0331 .0850 .0709 .0742
FAMILY -.0626 -.0745 -.0320 -.0477 -.0650
TOTPAY .0970 .5303** -.0794 -.0569 .0917
SUPPAY .0142 .0105 .3817** -.0450 -.0037
CIVJOB -.0745 • -.0823 -.1303 -.1378 -.1266
RETIRE -.0953 -.0107 .1883 .0663 .0837
THER EDUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
0792 .0506 .0797 .0467 .0626 .0908
0237 .3735** .2291* .3237** .3411** .2129*
0181 -.1021 -.1759 -.2414* -.2558* .0098
0476 -.0210 -.0155 .0526 .0402 .1535
0363 -.0757 .0066 -.0784 -.0648 -.0555
0000 .2412* .0800 .1766 .1731 -.0450
2412* 1.0000 .2130* .2939** .3111** -.0013
0800 .2130* 1.0000 .3982** .6263** .0462
1766 .2939** .3982** 1.0000 .9645** .1089
1731 .3111** .6263** .9645** 1.0000 .1059
0450 -.0013 .0462 .1089 .1059 1.0000
0666 -.0361 -.0402 -.0342 -.0406 -.2940**
0549 .0331 .1492 -.0460 .0038 -.0339
0330 .1077 -.0108 .1556 .1292 -.0504
0277 .2334* .1305 .2132* .2188* .2581*
0945 .0501 .0189 .1123 .1009 .1117
1276 -.0189 -.1069 .0110 -.0214 -.0055
0815 -.0274 .0886 -.0386 -.0072 .0464
0882 .0040 .0166 -.0871 -.0692 -.0433
1244 .0412 -.1136 -.0301 -.0583 .1283
0043 .3648** .1182 .2020* .2057* .0508
0030 -.0053 .2969** -.3369** -.2008* .0012
0717 .1313 .0780 .1820 .1772 -.1036
0516 -.0505 -.0410 -.0228 -.0312 -.0788
111
ARMY NON-OCCUPATIONAL (CONT)
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER .1096 -.0483 -.1822 .2999** .3678**
AGE -.1105 .1935 .0164 .6399** .0419
SEX -.0411- .2616** .0916 -.0656 -.2267*
BLACK .0239 .0068 -.0534 .0703 .0360
HISP -.0243 .0538 -.0407 -.0384 .1235
OTHER .0666 -.0549 -.0330 .0277 -.0945
EDUC -.0361 .0331 .1077 .2334* .0501
MARRIED -.0402 .1492 -.0108 .1305 .0189
DEPEND -.0342 -.0460 .1556 .2132* .1123
TOTDEP -.0406 .-. ,.0038 .1292 .2188* .1009
OCS -.2940** -.0839 -.0504 .2581* .1117
ROTC 1.0000 -.3589** -.2159* -.0622 -.1205
DIRECT -.3589** 1.0000 -.0616 -.0914 -.0995
MED -.2159* -.0616 1.0000 -.0452 .0577
LOS -.0622 -.0914 -.0452 1.0000 .1074
PROM -.1205 -.0995 .0577 .1074 1.0000
EXPECT .0856 -.0198 -.0296 -.1198 -.0945
DETAIL -.0071 .0860 .0708 -.0540 -.2078*
JOB .0G76 .1582 .0375 -.1981* -.3367**
FAMllY .0091 -.1019 -.1220 -.0149 -.1068
TOTPAY -.1728 .1174 .1878 .4007** .0487
SUPPAY -.0387 .2311* -.0961 -.0363 -.0722
CIVJOB -.1186 -.0764 .1510 -.1055 .0896
RETIRE -.0268 .0898 -.0579 -.1354 -.0498
EXPECT DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY
0296 -.2018* -.3047** -.0626 .0970 .0142
1396 -.0077 .0331 -.0745 .5308** .0105
0479 .1578 .0850 -.0320 -.0794 .3317**
0237 .1616 .0709 -.0477 -.0569 -.0450
0097 -.0130 .0742 -.0650 .0917 -.0087
1276 .0815 .0832 .1244 -.0043 .0030
0189 -.0274 .0040 .0412 .3648** -.0053
1069 .0886 .0166 -.1136 .1182 .2969**
0110 -.0386 -.0371 -.0301 .2020* -.3369**
0214 -.0072 -.0692 -.0583 .2057* -.2008*
0055 .0464 -.0433 .1283 .0508 .0012
0856 -.0071 .0076 .0091 -.1728 -.0337
0198 .0860 .1582 -.1019 .1174 .2311*
0296 .0703 .0375 -.1220 .1878 -.0961
1198 -.0540 -.1981* -.0149 .4007** -.0363
0945 -.2078* -.3367** -.1068 .0487 -.0722
0000 .1833 .2084* .2249* -.0644 -.0199
1833 1 .0000 .5574** -.0226 -.0523 -.0304
2084* .5574** 1. 0000 -.0583 -.0262 .0490
2249* -.0226 -.0583 1.0000 -.0381 -.0423
0644 -.0523 -.0262 -.0881 1 .0000 -.0030
0199 -.0304 .0490 -.0423 -.0030 1. 0000
0765 -.1754 -.1191 .1132 .0524 -.0682




























* - SIGNIF. LE .01 XX - SIGNIF. LE .001
Cl-TAILED, n . n PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
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ALL MARINE CORPS
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .1774XX -.1170XX .0262 .0020
AGE .1774XX 1.0000 .1526XX .0090 -.0266
SEX -.1170** .1326XX 1.0000 .0464 -.0473
BLACK .0262 .0090 .0464 1.0000 -.0570
HISP .0020 -.0266 -.0473 -.0370 1.0000
OTHER -.0736 -.0007 .0136 -.0260 -.0219
EDUC .0428 .2889XX .1153XX .0384 -.0267
MARRIED .0914* .155SXX -.2220XX -.0507 -.0178
DEPEND .0592 - .3078** -.1452XX .0140 -.0244
TOTDEP .0770* .2976XX -.1864XX -.0050 -.0253
CCS -.0492 .5855XX .2549XX .0126 -.0761
ROTC -.0227 -.1895XX -.1086XX .0192 -.0150
DIRECT .0306 .1428XX .1222XX -.0154 .0750
MED m , , a .
LOS .2346XX .7447XX .0048 -.0026 .0209
PROM .1131X3 -.2592XX .0130 .0180 -.0016
EXPECT -.1950** .0101 -.0093 .0224 -.0428
DETAIL- -.19S0XX -.0069 .0902* .0587 -.0146
JOB -.1828XX .0747 .0645 .0277 .0050
FAMILY -.1461** -.0855X -.0594 -.0428 -.0503
TOTPAY .1482** .5908XX -.1697XX -.1144XX -.0734
SUPPAY -.0293 .1310XX •5S41XX .0215 . -.0300
CIVJOB .0056 -.0889X -.1252XX .0103 -.0620

























DUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
0428 .0914X .0592 .0770X -.0492
28S9XX .1558XX .5073XX .2976** .5855XX
1155XX -.2220XX -.1452XX -.1864XX .2549XX
0584 -.0507 .0140 -.0050 .0126
0267 -.0178 -.0244 -.0255 -.0761
0411 .0570 -.0211 -.0051 .0159
0000 .0572 .0695 .0741 .06 25
0572 1.0000 .4845XX .7106XX -.0554
0695 .4845X* 1.0000 .9598XX .0665
0741 .7106XX .9598XX 1.0000 .0420
0625 -.0554 .0665 .0420 1.0000
0526 .0565 -.0326X -.0547 -.5009XX
1270XX -.0204 -.0116 -.0158 -.0489
2559** !l952xx !5016xx !5052xx !l50ixx
0967* -.0670 -.1061XX -.1069XX -.0527
0076 -.0044 .0727 .0571 .0257
0192 -.0226 .0117 .0021 .0251
0140 -.0175 .0656 .0456 .0975X
0152 .0021 .0155 .0114 .0589
1062XX .2284XX .2607XX .2850XX .0865X
0761 .2857XX -.0594 .0459 .0899X
0518 -.0289 -.0442 -.0448 -.0472
0559 .0059 .0578 .0525 .0526
11^
ALL MARINE CORPS (CONT)
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER -.0227 .0306 .2546XX .1131XX
AGE -.1895XX .1428XX .7447XX -.2592XX
SEX -.1086** .1222XX .0048 .0130
BLACK .0192 -.0154 -.0026 .0180
HISP -.0130 .0730 .0209 -.0016
OTHER .0144 -.0091 -.0281 -.0462
EDUC -.0526 .1270XX .2359XX -.0967X
MARRIED .0365 -.0204 .1952XX -.0670
DEPEND -.0826* --.-0116 .3016XX -.1061XX
TOTDEP -.0547 -.0158 .3052XX -.1069XX
ocs -.3009** -.0489 .1301XX -.0527
ROTC 1.0000 -.0334 -.1540XX .0536
DIRECT • -.0334 1.0000 .0S05X -.0806X
MED 1 0000 ,
LOS -.1540XX .0805* 1.0000 -.2124XX
PROM .0536 -.0806* -.2124XX 1.0000
EXPECT -.0437 .0276 -.0021 -.1497XX
DETALL " -.0304 -.0172 .0270 -.1246XX
JOB -.0626 -.0081 .0028 -.2566XX
FAMILY -.0302 -.0482 -.0530 .0012
TOTPAY -.0839X .0143 .5536XX -.2777XX
SUPPAY .0405 .0772X .0829X -.0377
CIVJOB .0407 -.0133 -.0431 .1920XX












































































































































































x - SIGNIF. LE .01 x* - SIGNIF. LE .001
Cl-TAILED, "
.
" PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
116
MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .2724XX -.1514X .0328 -.0009
AGE .2724XX 1.0000 -.0276 -.0635 -.0596
SEX -.1514* -.0276 1.0000 -.0121 -.0314
BLACK .0328 -.0635 -.0121 1.0000 -.0156
HISP -.0009 -.0596 -.0314 -.0156 1.0000
OTHER -.1124 -.0009. .1138 -.0113 -.0294
EDUC .0493 .2244XX .0175 -.0247 -.0642
MARRIED .1952XX .2240XX -.1434X .0431 .0024
DEPEND .0862 .3674XX -.1471X .0658 .0047
TOTDEP .1300* .3668XX -.1634X .0666 .0046
OCS -.0686 .3948XX .1116 .0341 -.0973
ROTC -.0477 -.2002XX -.0760 .0609 .0203
DIRECT • • • • •
MED • • • • •
LOS .3491** .7866XX -.1060 -.0979 .0205
PROM .0761 -.2285XX .0181 .0733 -.0299
EXPECT -.2274XX .0001 .1091 -.0118 -.0656
DETAIL -.2126XX -.0138 -.0039 -.0019 .0236
JOB - -.2018XX .0436 .0838 -.0160 .0103
FA*MILY -.1513* ' -.1450X -.0102 .0726 -.0309
TOTPAY .2148XX •6420XX -.1642X -.0723 -.0895
SUPPAY .1104 .0843 .0922 -.0074 -.0410
CIVJOB -.0481 -.1960XX -.1993XX .0501 -.0525
























:duc MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
0493 .1952XX .0862 .1300X -.0686
2244XX .2240XX .3674XX - .3668XX .3948XX
0175 -.1434X -.1471X -.1634X .1116
0247 ' .0431 .0658 .0666 .0341
0642 .0024 • .0047 .0046 -.0973
0974 -.0172 -.0814 -.0712 -.0041
0000 .0303 •1607X .1550X
.0393
0803 1.0000 .4973XX .7110XX
.0089
1607X •4973XX 1 .0000 .9656XX .1455X
1550X .7110XX .9636XX 1.0000 .1207









2381XX !2688XX !3420XX !3600xx !l744xx
1524X
-.0485 -.1028 -.0983 -.0823
0369 -.1306X .0143 -.0286 .0633
0366 .0073 .0459 .0394 . 0633
0043 -.0407 .0767 .0497 .1085
0773 -.0743 -.0428 -.0576 .0756





0519 .0034 .0615 .0509 .0905
117
MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONSCCONT)
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER -.0477 .3491XX .0761
AGE -.2002** .7866XX -.2285XX
SEX -.0760 - -.1060 .0181
BLACK .0609 -.0979 .0733
HISP .0203 .0205 -.0299
OTHER .0352 • m -.0808 -.0400
EDUC .0544 .23S1XX -.1524X
MARRIED .0017 .2683XX -.0485
DEPEND -.1376X .3420XX -.1028
TOTDEP -.1110 - .3600XX -.0983
OCS -.3170XX .1744XX -.0823
ROTC 1.0000 -.1387X .0959
DIRECT 1 0000 • •
MED # . 1 0000 • •
LOS -.1387* 1.0000 -.2018XX
PROM .0959 -.2018XX 1.0000
EXPECT -.0654 -.0459 -.1930XX
DETAIL -.0683 -.0032 -.1719XX
JOB -.1133 -.0217 -.2711XX
FAMILY -.0472 -.1237 .0305
TOTPAY " -.1386* .6252XX -.2927XX
SUPPAY .0925 .0745 .0174
CIVJOB .0390 -.1629X - . 1922XX






































































































































































X - SIGNIF. LE .01 xx - SIGNIF. LE .001
(l-TAILED, n . " PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
119
MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE
CAREER AGE SEX BLACK HISP
CAREER 1.0000 .0829 -.1389 .0725 .0581
AGE .0829 1.0000 .0887 -.1583 .1475
SEX -.1389 .0887 1.0000 -.1127 .1119
BLACK .0725 -.1583 -.1127 1.0000 -.0446
HISP .0581 .1475 .1119 -.0446 1.0000
OTHER -.1207 -.0248 -.1554 -.0446 -.0174
EDUC .1142 .2210* -.1010 .0454 .0670
MARRIED -.0396 .0877 -.3463** -.0407 -.0388
DEPEND -.0467 .2205* -.1274 .0743 .0198
TOTDEP -.0511 .2086 -.2174* .0473 .0035
OCS -.0803 '.36 22** .2920** -.0131 -.1159
ROTC -.0644 -.2027 .0927 .0200 -.0357
DIRECT .0409 .1905 .0738 -.0314 .7041**
MED _ # . t ,
LOS .2538* .6611** -.1022 -.0993 .1724
PROM .1761 -.2243* .0228 .0101 .0276
EXPECT -.1229 -.0356 -.0232 .0991 .0036
DETAIL -.0696 -.0064 .1539 -.1173 -.0133
JOB -.0968 .0746 .2475* .0514 -.0089
FAMItY -.0547 -.0504 -.0018 -.1873 .0620
TOTPAY .0779 .7385** -.1468 -.1663 .0925
SUPPAY -.2476* .1784 .3646** -.0927 .0385
CIVJOB .1651 -.0231 -.1632 .0785 -.1566




















































































































































MARINE CORPS ADMINISTRATIVE (CONT)









































































DETAIL JOB FAMILY TOTPAY SUPPAY
.0696 -.0968 -.0547 .0779 -.2476*
.0064 .0746 -.0504 .7385** .1784
.1539 .2475* -.0018 -.1468 ..3646X*
.1173 .0514 -.1873 -.1663 -.0927
.0133 -.0089 .0620 .0925 .0385
.1431 .0349 .0145 .0996 -.0474
.0242 -.0407 -.0867 .1327 .2215*
.0648 -.1209 .0531 .1711 .4370XX
.0693 -.0302 .0319 .2044 .0949
.0777 -.0643 .0435 .2223X .2206*
.0131 .1786 -.0034 .1463 .0714
.0726 .0583 .1697 -.0738 .3212X*
.0094 .0077 -.0773 .0677 .1277
!0082 -!0128 !0102 !6999*x !0927
.0377 -.1833 .0212 -.3923X* -.1974
.2175X .2475* .1907 -.0320 .0307
.0000 .4625** .2600* .0028 .1084
.4625XX 1.0000 .0447 .0006 .1294
.2600* .0447 1.0000 .0116 .1266
.0028 .0006 .0116 1.0000 .1749
.1084 .1294 .1266 .1749 1.0000
.2095 -.1475 -.0930 -.0793 -.0800
.2263* .2401X .2523* -.1455 .0827
121

























RETIRE- • -.1446 1.0000
* - SIGNIF. LE .01 ** - SIGNIF. LE .001
(1-TAILED, "
.
" PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
122
MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL

























1.0000 .1424 -.0152 .0880 -.0570
.1424 1.0000 .1367* .0916 .0365
-.0152 .1867* 1.0000 -.0031 -.0614
.0880 .0916 -.0031 1.0000 -.0363
-.0570 .0365 -.0614 -.0363 1.0000
-!o035 !2823*x !o035 !l238 -!0508
.0836 .1218 -.0406 -.0716 -.0965
.1372 .3783** -.0721 -.0390 -.0448
.1380 -•'- .3467** -.0714 -.0540 -.0665











!2040* !7411*X !0882 !0165 !0439
.1582 -.2136* .0353 -.0349 -.0443
-.2176* -.0133 -.0128 .0503 .1348
-.2469XX -.0377 .0964 -.0230 .0165
-.2952** .0793 .1245 .0157 .0435
-.2164* -.0948 -.0872 -.1147 .0141
.0858 •5877XX -.0923 - -.0721 .0035
.0236 .1432 .4543XX .0217 -.0560
.0025 .0203 -.0742 .0122 -.1246
-.1493 .0920 .0053 .0457 .0319
OTHER
0000
DUC MARRIED DEPEND TOTDEP OCS
0035 .0836 .1372 .1380 .0606
2823XX .1218 .3783** .3467XX .4025**
0035 -.0406 -.0721 -.0714 .3168**
1238 -.0716 -.0390 -.0540 - -.0698
0508 -.0965 -.0448 -.0665 -.0941
0000 !0304 -.0192 -!0063 !0054
0304 1.0000 .4689XX .6925XX .0366
0192 .4689XX 1.0000 .9619XX .0518
0063 .6925XX .9619** 1.0000 .0536








2745XX !l353 !3525*x .3298** !0680
0836 .1315 -.0867 -.0301 .0471
0237 .0885 .0218 .0452 -.0373
0149 -.0613 -.0464 -.0569 -.0137
0501 .0201 .0116 .0157 .0448
0186 .0415 -.0296 -.0114 -.0353
1785 .1225 .3399XX .3155XX -.0267
0437 .2963XX -.0852 .0221 .1967*
1981* -.0240 -.0753 -.0690 -.0588
0194 .0407 .0274 .0349 -.0864
123
MARINE CORPS NON-OCCUPATIONAL CCONT)
ROTC DIRECT MED LOS PROM
CAREER -.0773 .2040X .1582
AGE -.2629XX - .7411XX -.2136X
SEX -.0931 ' .0882 .0353
BLACK .0677 .0165 -.0349





MARRIED -.0124 .1353 .1315.
DEPEND -.1233 .3525XX -.0867
TOTDEP -.1045 - -
, .3298XX -.0301
OCS -.3388XX .0680 " .0471
ROTC 1.0000 -.1926X .1563
DIRECT 1 0000 • •
MED • 1 0000 • •
LOS -.1926X 1.0000 -.2205X
PROM .1563 -.2205X 1.0000
EXPECT -.0711 -.0526 -.0297
DETAIL .0242 .0269 -.1219
JOB -.1267 .
-.0203 -.2332X
FAMILY -.0943 -.0175 -.0855
TOTPAY -.3076XX .6242XX -.3238XX
SUPPAY .0629 .0402 .1444
CIVJOB .0066 .0241 .1201
































































































































































* - SIGNIF. LE .01 x* - SIGNIF". LE .001
Cl-TAILED, n . PRINTED IF A COEFFICIENT CANNOT BE COMPUTED)
125
APPENDIX D
FREQUENCIES OF SUBJECT'S RESPONSES TO VARIABLES






23 : : I 1 I
24 1 I I
25 : I 9 I
26 7 I 37 I
27 : 21 I 85 I
28 11 I 99 I
29 14 I 108 I
30 16 I 105 I
31 : 17 I 136 I
32 8 I 108 I
33 7 I 115 I
34 . 9 I 70 I
35 4 I 37 I





















































: 12 : [ 12
[ 1.0%
2 8 [ 10
[ .9%












1 3 : [ 4
[ .3%
-
: o : l :[ 1
[ .1%


















































BLACK I 15 I 112
HISP I 6 I 34
OTHER I 8 I 33


































































o :[ i :
ROW
TOTAL
65 : 434 :[ 499
[ 43.0%
l : 30 200 : [ 230
[ 19.8%
2 : 20 : 251 [ 271
[ 23.3%
3 : 5 : 106 C 111
9.6%
- 4 V " 7 25 : [ 32
2.8%
5 : 1 11 [ 12
: i.o%
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APPENDIX E
LOGIT EQUATION FOR MARINE CORPS TACTICAL OPERATIONS
MARRIED EXCLUDED
(dependent variable = 1 if intend to make Army a career)
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